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ABSTRACT
Civilized culture is killing the planet. At present, we are facing the largest extinction
event in 65 million years and the cause, according to most scholars, is ―patently‖ human. My
question, however, is not whether the mass destruction of the biosphere is the result of an
unfortunate and misguided particularity within civilization (e.g., over consumption, driving too
much, etc.), but rather: Is it the case that civilization, by its very nature, entails the destruction of
the natural world and of both human and non-human communities?
In the vein of a fairly recent movement in scholarship, my answer is a resounding ―yes.‖
Taking a cue from one the foremost voices of this recent movement, Derrick Jensen, I‘ll briefly
trace the genesis and justification of the following premise: ―Civilization is not and can never be
sustainable,‖ as well as the philosophical fallout of what this may mean for us today. Employing
the thought and method of certain strands of phenomenology, I first examine how it is that
civilization appears in our collective everydayness and how certain movements within this
appearance give way to its replication, continuation, and (largely) unquestioned legitimacy. From
there, I move to incorporate the insight of Theodor Adorno and other critical theorists,
uncovering the finer ideological strands that tie us to civilization. From the arguments outlined
by Jensen, John Zerzan, and others, I make a case for the active rejection and dismantling of
civilization, ultimately attempting to articulate a philosophically based strategy of resistance.
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INTRODUCTION
When Heidegger set upon the question of the meaning of Being, what had seemed so
obvious and tacitly understood was, instead, obscured, concealed, and utterly baffling upon
further reflection. ―Being‖ had assumed a very specific place within certain currents of western
philosophy, though its mass proliferation into the everyday discourse of philosopher and layman
alike hid any sort of explicit meaning or understanding of ―Being.‖ Whether or not we may agree
with the analysis of Heidegger on the question of Being, the point is that in the exposure of what
seems so obvious and given we are thrust into a space of re-evaluation, reflection, and thinking.
In the ―everyday‖ of our experience there is a kind of pre-reflective and assumed
―pseudo-totality‖ that constitutes a particular sense of normality. As such, interruptions in this
perceived order tend to uncover and make-noticed what had previously been unquestioned or
unnoticed, that is, a kind of ―gap‖ in the field that, in a sense, surrounds intentionality is
simultaneously noticed and ―filled.‖ But this filling does not necessarily require one to
reconstruct the perceived ―totality‖ of what is experienced (and thus return to ―normality‖),
rather, it reveals aspects about the everyday (or beyond) and imparts, if only slightly, a ―deeper‖
and more fundamental understanding of being-in-the-world. A revealing of this sort marks a
departure from the taken-for-granted and, by way of reflection, a critical re-assessment of what is
known as the everyday.
An account of what rests in the obviousness of the everyday—what is so obvious as to
escape reflection—requires a particular kind of ―revealing.‖ The scope of this text is to take to
task the phenomenon of civilization, revealing its structure, meaning, and being and what this

1

may mean for us today. From its origins in domestication and systematized division of labor
roughly 10,000 years ago, civilization has increasingly held and defined a dominant place in the
conceptual and ideological enframing of everyday individual/collective experience.1 Civilization,
though, is not a mere thing within or on a horizon of perception, but rather, it may in part be
understood as a fundamental hermeneutical lens through which our interpretation and
understanding is decisively shaped (Though, dialectically, civilization-as-interpretative lens
gains its thrust, as will argue, through physical, material instantiation.). As such, it has enjoyed a
relatively categorical and unqualified justification founded in its seemingly pre-reflective
givenness in experience—a givenness largely constituted by civilizations appearance as an
inevitable, ahistorical totality. Furthermore, in this tacit justification a normative weight is
attached to the project of civilization. This weight is made explicit in ideologically informed
constructions of concepts like ―progress,‖ ―advancement‖ (―advanced‖), ―developed,‖ and even
―nature‖ to some extent. Each of these concepts has, in some way, been appropriated to bolster,
expand, and lend moral legitimacy to the overall project of civilization. Though, as some have
remarked, ―it is a weird and peculiar world where the growing destruction of the earth is touted
as ‗progress,‘ an advance for humanity.‖2 It is in the midst of this well documented destruction of
the earth that I find reason to rethink everything about the way we humans live.
My question, however, is not whether the mass destruction of the biosphere is the result
of an unfortunate and misguided particularity within civilization (e.g., over consumption, driving
too much, etc.), but rather: Is it the case that civilization, through its very nature, entails the

1

My use of Heidegger‘s ―enframing,‖ here, is intentional and shall be expounded in Chapter 3.
David Brown, introduction to Elements of Refusal, by John Zerzan, 2nd rev. ed. (Columbia, MO: C.A.L. Press,
1999), 9.
2
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destruction of the natural world and of both human and non-human communities? In the vein of
a fairly recent movement in scholarship, my answer is a resounding ―yes.‖ Taking a cue from
one the foremost voices of this recent movement, Derrick Jensen, I‘ll briefly trace the genesis
and justification of the following premise: ―Civilization is not and can never be sustainable.‖3
Figuring out what this may mean for those of us situated in civilization is, like
civilization, complex. It requires assuming, in part, the structure and conventions of that which is
to be critiqued, that is, a kind of immanent critique not dissimilar to that employed by the
Frankfurt School. In affirming civilization‘s inherent unsustainability—and not just its inability
to sustain itself but also, and correlatively, its active and systematic destruction of the possibility
for the sustaining of other non-civilized communities (ecosystems, indigenous peoples, etc.)—an
entire other strata of questions and new directions is opened up. By exploring our experiential
relationship with civilization, that is, the attempt to understand civilization as it effects and
shapes our being-in-the-world, we can, perhaps, chart these new directions.
In order to move closer to that understanding, I begin Chapter One by offering a brief
survey of the contemporary global ecological crisis. In this way, the reader may be reminded of
what exactly is at stake. I hesitated to include descriptions of the earth‘s destruction, but as the
ideas in other sections developed it became apparent that the physical, biological reality of our
situation (though repeated and widespread amongst varying media contingents) is often, in a
sense, forgotten. In our everyday life we hear news of extinction, catastrophic global warming,
and so forth, though because it does not seem to intrude on our everyday, the reports and the real
yet seemingly abstract and distant contents of the reports, are replaced by other, ostensibly more

3

Derrick Jensen, Endgame (2 Vols. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006), ix.
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immediate concerns (e.g., going to work, feeding oneself or ones children, or obsessing over the
most recent celebrity breakup). Moving towards the close of the first chapter, I pose the question
regarding the sustainability of civilization as such.
Chapter Two addresses this question through a historical accounting of sorts. Here, the
concern has less to do with contemporary case studies and events and, instead, moves to clarify
what exactly is meant by ―civilization.‖ Drawing from the insight of philosophers (Plato, Adorno
and Horkheimer, et al.), anthropologists (Jared Diamond, Stanley Diamond, Marshall Sahlins,
and Lewis Mumford), and contemporary critics (John Zerzan, Derrick Jensen, Lierre Keith, et
al.) I outline a few commensurable working definitions of civilization. By uncovering some of
the foundational elements that, historically, have come to define what we call civilization, an
adequate framework for delving into the finer philosophical points of this dominant way of being
is set.
Chapters Three and Four are the heart, philosophically, of argumentation and serve as the
grounds for the proposed active rejection and dismantling of civilization in Chapter 5. I begin
Chapter Three by coming back to Chapter One and asking, in a phenomenological sense, how is
it that we experience, perceive, and interpret the events described in Chapter One. Throughout
the chapter, this questioning develops into the more specific concern regarding civilization. A
treatment of civilization-as-given, as well as the origins of such givenness, substantiates the
closing injections of criticism through a loose phenomenological standpoint.
Moving to Chapter Four, a discussion of experience continues, though it is now primarily
in the hands of the Frankfurt school and critical theory in general. Despite the majority of
theorists on either the phenomenological side or the side of critical theory holding a kind of
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general disagreement, I have found similarities that I think, given the possibility of future
analyses, hold much promise.4 Principally, the section is guided by the work of Theodor Adorno.
From Adorno‘s ―negative dialectics,‖ the analysis first moves into a critique of civilized
ideology, equivalency, and the fallout from these concepts via Adorno‘s notion of ―nonidentity.‖
From there, I turn to Heidegger and his work on technology, examining this defining element of
civilization, albeit in a critical light. At the end of Chapter Four I return to a few foundational
elements of civilization mentioned in Chapter Two, namely domestication and the division of
labor. Through the analysis of Zerzan, Adorno and Horkheimer, and Paul Shepard I argue that
these founding elements are largely, if not entirely, to blame for the current crises—social
inequality, ecological devastation, and the general alienation of human-to-human and human-tononhuman.
The conclusion, suggested throughout the text, is a general rejection of civilization. This
rejection, however, is not merely (passively) philosophical. Instead, I argue, this rejection
necessarily implies active resistance. Examining the general attitude and scope of contemporary
environmentalism, its tendency to reinforce some of the same ideological mechanisms of those
who destroy the planet, I offer, through the voices of a movement known as ―Deep Green
Resistance,‖ a philosophical grounding for a strategy of resistance.
This text, no doubt, will prove controversial. It‘s status as ―philosophical‖ may even be in
question given the breadth of anthropological and sociological analysis as well as the influence
from a traditionally ―non-academic‖ source like Derrick Jensen. But it is precisely the work of
4

There has recently been a few texts pairing the philosophies of Heidegger and Adorno, but the ―field‖ seems
extremely small. The most in depth analysis I‘ve seen comes from a collection of essays edited by Iain Macdonald
(University of Montreal) and Krzysztof Ziarek (University of Buffalo). Iain Macdonald, Krzysztof Ziarek, eds.
Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008.
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folks like Jensen who, in rendering some of these ―heavier‖ philosophical ideas accessible to
general public, strikes a blow at the institutionalized inequality present in so many echelons of
academia. The attitude of those who would take seriously the conclusions of this work, or the
work of Zerzan, Jensen, and others, is, as I argue in my conclusion, purely pragmatic. It is a
concern, by any means, to ensure that the planet is not destroyed at the hands of man.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
The recent surge of interest in matters of ecology, environment, nature, call it what you
will, has largely been the result of reactions to certain scientific facts and observations. While I
don't wish to go too in-depth in particular facts, I will, for the sake of adding some context,
mention a few problems that have been instrumental in my even beginning this work. My
reasons for including a treatment of scientific facts regarding the state of the planet serve to
illustrate what is also a central point in the overall argument. Namely, even as these facts have
been widely available, distributed, and mentioned many times elsewhere, their weight and
importance tends to escape us in everyday life. Thus, including just a few facts here, then
showing the implications (philosophical and otherwise) further on, the reader may be reminded
of the material-biological reality and direction of the biosphere. To note, I will not be including a
direct discussion on global warming. Though, in my eyes, this is certainly one of the direst
threats facing life on this planet, the context I am presenting can do well without discussing it.
Notwithstanding, there is still an amazing contingency of individuals who deny the prospects of
anthropogenic climate change and I do not wish to be immediately written off by this strange
group of people.5
To begin, it has been noted by a number of prominent paleontologists, biologists,
anthropologists, archaeologists, and others, that the world is currently in the throws of its sixth
5

Indeed, just a few days ago (March 15, 2011) the U.S. House Republicans voted against a measure that would
acknowledge the prospect of human-induced climate change, effectively denying the possibility altogether. This
follows days after a house panel voted to strip the E.P.A. of its ability to regulate greenhouse gases. Lucy Madison,
―House Republicans Reject Climate Change Science,‖ CBS News, March 16, 2011, accessed March 26, 2011,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20043909-503544.html.
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―mass-extinction‖—the largest extinction in 65 million years. This ―sixth extinction,‖ aptly
named by some as the ―Anthropocene‖ extinction,6 has its epochal inertia somewhere around
11,000 years ago, i.e., the beginning of agriculture and thus, in part, civilization. Another
defining thrust is given at the onset of the industrial revolution. However, many have cited the
beginning of this extinction not with the advent of civilization, but with the arrival of humans as
such in certain lands (i.e., the ―Pleistocene Overkill Hypothesis‖). But this hypothesis, while still
debated in many circles, often betrays its scientific conclusions by making unwarranted
conjectures into the philosophical realm.7 The stark difference between the first period of
extinction and the second, which I think we may classify as the lead-in and coming-to-be of
industrialism, rests in the fact that activity by primitive (non-civilized) humans in the first could
never have been capable of putting the entire planet at risk. Humans in the second period,
however, are entirely capable of destroying most everything on this planet and, for some reason
or another, seem to be actualizing this capability (albeit, perhaps unknowingly).8 This is not to
suggest a difference in cognitive abilities between primitive and contemporary humans (indeed,
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See also, ―Holocene‖ or ―Holocene-Anthropocene‖
The camp promoting the theory regarding overhunting has (despite a great deal of evidence), in recent times, been
challenged on a number of grounds and I entertain it here because, often, it serves as some odd argument that
condemns the nature of agentive human beings (or agency itself) as necessarily disposed to destroy their
surroundings; hence, a justification for current human and nonhuman exploitation. This, of course, disavows the
prior 188,000 years of the human species. Of additional interest, the timeline of human arrival (the so-called
―clovis‖ culture) on the North American continent, which was thought to coincide with the extinction of large
megafauna, has been cast into doubt by recent findings in Texas. Researchers from Texas A&M, based on the
finding of tools that 1) are markedly different that those used by the clovis people and 2) pre-date the assumed
arrival by at least 2500 years. Alok Jha, ―Humans Arrive in North America 2,500 Years Earlier Than Thought,‖ The
Guardian, March 24, 2011, accessed March 26, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/mar/24/humansnorth-america-stone-tools.
8
Derrick Jensen, working from the arguments made by Eugene S. Hunn (University of Washington, professor of
anthropology), makes a similar argument, ironically concluding that ―if you truly believe that humans are
‗thoroughly superior predators‘ who always will destroy their habitat (and the habitat of others), and if you believe
that the civilized are more destructive because, well, the civilized are better at everything… and if you care the
slightest about the natural world, you need to get rid of all humans before they destroy it all.‖ Jensen, Engame, 541544.
7
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there were virtually no differences in regards to cognitive capacity9), but rather a difference in
technique, scope, and ways of perceiving and unde0rstanding the world. Additionally, the
behavioral trend for modern humans, according to many scholars, solidified somewhere around
50,000 years ago.10 This, coupled with other evidence, begs the question from those who would
argue for humans ―inherently destructive nature‖: How do you account for the other 99 percent
of Homo Sapien Sapien’s history and our not so distant relatives ability to manage a way of
living that was wholly sustainable, that is, not predicated on mass destruction?
In any case, by understanding some of the implications of human activity—of
civilization—in the contemporary world, we can begin to grasp the urgency and importance of
the topic of this text. Moreover, we may be reminded of what is at stake.
Niles Eldredge, a curator at the American Museum of Natural History and professor of
biology at the City University of New York, classifies the current mass extinction as a ―patently
human-caused event‖ that is reducible to four major factors: ―transformation of the landscape,‖
―overexploitation of species,‖ ―pollution,‖ and ―the introduction of alien species.‖11
While the exact meaning of these factors has, at times, been disputed, it gives a general
understanding of what is happening. Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson has put the rate of extinction

9

Thomas Wynn and Fredric Coolidge, ―Working Memory, its Executive Functions, and the Emergence of Modern
Thinking,‖ Cambridge Archaeological Journal 15, no. 1 (2005): 5-26. Here, Wynn and Coolidge propose that the
origin of modern thinking arises somewhere between 60,000 and 130,000 years ago with modifications, of course,
coming into play only recently with language and increasingly abstract thought. We can also pull from recent
archaeological evidence of Homo Erectus’ apparent ―seafaring capabilities‖ 700,000 to 800,000 years ago to close
the popularized gap between ―stupid caveman‖ and refined, modern ―civilized‖ folks. Jon M. Erlandson,
―Anatomically Modern Humans, Maritime Voyaging, and the Pleistocene Colonization of The Americas,‖ in The
first Americans: the Pleistocene colonization of the New World, ed. Nina G. Jablonski, (San Francisco, CA:
University of California Press, 2002), 68.
10
Christopher Henshilwood and Curtis W. Marean, ―The Origin of Modern Human Behavior,‖ Current
Anthropology 44, no. 5 (2003): 627-651.
11
Niles Eldredge, ―The Sixth-Extinction,‖ June 2001, ActionBioscience (American Institute for Biological
Sciences) http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/eldredge2.html.
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at around 27,000 species per year.12 Eldredge, similarly, has argued that the rate of species
extinction is currently hovering around 30,000 per year.13 If we consider the background
―normal‖ extinction rate, calculated via fossil records, to be around one species per year for
every million species that exists, then the current levels of extinction are astronomically
alarming.14 And, again, to put it in other terms, according to a report issued by the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (An association consisting of around 1,000 organizations and
―thousands of participating scientists‖), ―One in four mammal species, one in eight bird species
and one in three amphibian species‖ are currently threatened with extinction.15
The point to be illustrated here is two-fold. First, the factors that lead to the extinction of
species are based on the ―cutting off,‖ if you will, of one or more of three fundamental
necessities that sustain most life on this planet. Though before listing these three factors I will
ask that the reader think about the following question: What is, in fact, required for life to be
sustained on this planet? The response to this question may be relevant for the following chapter,
gauging our somewhat immediate pre-reflective understandings of the surrounding world. If the
answers were ―food, clothing, and shelter‖ then there is, in regards to the next step I will make, a
point to be made about the way we humans see ourselves and relate to the biological-reality of

12

Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (New York, NY: Harvard University Press and W.W. Norton, 1999),
280.
13
Niles Eldredge, Life in the Balance: Humanity and the Biodiversity Crisis (New York, NY: Nevraumont, 1998),
vii.
14
To note, even species lucky enough to have been considered at risk for extinction face worse prospects than
originally thought. According to University of Colorado study in 2008, the risk of many of these species has been
greatly underestimated because of a mathematical error in the method used to determine such rates. Some species
are now thought to be facing up to a ―100-fold‖ increase in risk. (University of Colorado at Boulder. Species
Extinction Threat Underestimated Due To Math Glitch. ScienceDaily 3 July 2008. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/080702132238.htm.
15
Species Extinction Threat Underestimated Due To Math Glitch. ScienceDaily 3 July 2008.
http://www.sciencedaily.com- /releases/2008/07/080702132238.htm.
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the world. ―Food, clothing, and shelter,‖ while necessary in some sense (especially for humans),
are not exactly the primary objects of focus. We need to consider the matter in a more
fundamental sense. What is it that makes possible food, clothing, and shelter? My answer to this
question, and the answers of others seeking ways of how we may respond to the above facts of
extinction and human activity, I think, may be based around the following factors: clean air,
clean water, and a healthy landbase, i.e., one that is capable of sustaining dynamic and biodiverse
forms of life.
Secondly, it follows that when one or more of these factors are removed or rendered
inaccessible by or to particular forms of life (also remembering that all three are heavily
interrelated), then those forms of life are then subject to being destroyed. They cannot survive
without all three. It is also reasonable, then, to suppose that humans are not exempt from these
processes, that is, we are not exempt from extinction.
An indicator of just how rapid humans are extinguishing the means to life would be the
rate and scale of deforestation on any particular continent. However, the facts seem much more
shocking when given in global terms. Overall, the world is losing, on average, 13 million
hectares (a bit over 32 million acres) of forest each year.16 In even more shocking terms, that
equates to around 36 football fields of forest being slashed down every minute. By some
accounts, ―The United States has lost 95 percent of its original forests, Nigeria 99 percent.
Countries with less than 10 percent of their old-growth forests left by the end of the twentieth
century include Argentina, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, and Sweden. Countries

16

Manny Mogato, ―U.N. Calls on Asian nations to end Deforestation.‖ Reuters, Ed. Carmel Crimmins and Roger
Crabb. June 20, 2008 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSMAN18800220080620 [accessed December 31, 2010].
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such as Australia, Honduras, Malaysia, and Zaire had lost about 80 percent.‖17 Given that over
80% of the worlds biodiversity may be found in forests, the destruction of these habitats should
be, at the least, alarming (we could also add that these sorts of forests are vital for the overall
atmospheric health of the planet as well).18 And to note, simply replanting tracts of forest, while
certainly better than nothing, can never replace the biodiversity that had been built up over
hundreds and, sometimes thousands, of years.
The chief cause and instigator in the mass de-nuding of forests across the globe may be
attributed to any section of industrial or post-industrial society. Whether it‘s clearing forests for
further ―development,‖ turning the forest into the 2X4 framing for shabby suburban houses, land
for cattle and other livestock, or simply paper and cardboard, the persistent, ever increasing,
clearing of every land is absolutely unsustainable. As Jared Diamond has observed, ―The process
through which past societies have undermined themselves by damaging their environments fall
into eight categories,‖ the first, he explains, being ―deforestation and habitat destruction.‖19
However, the question remains: Is mass deforestation not the ultimate consequence of
civilization as such? Certainly, we find in one of civilizations oldest texts, The Epic of
Gilgamesh, a detailed account of deforestation. Gilgamesh, along with his companion, Enkidu,
pursues ―Humbaba the terrible‖ (a god who is the guardian of the cedar forest) declaring that he
shall kill the guardian and ―cut down the cedar.‖20

17

Terry Glavin, The Sixth Extinction: Journeys Among the Lost and Left Behind (New York: St. Martin‘s Press,
2007), 202.
18
For a more in depth look at deforestation, I would suggest Derrick Jensen and George Draffen's ―Strangely Like
War: The Global Assault on Forests.‖ Chelsea Green: White River junction, VT. 2003.
19
Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin, 2005).
20
The Epic of Gilgamesh, trans. Maureen Gallery Kovacs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 20.
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By any means conceived, can the success of civilization be predicated on anything but
the cutting down of large tracts of forest? One may reply by citing the use of other more durable
products, metals, plastics, and the like, as taking the place timber. However, these industries—
the mining and drilling industries—bring an entirely new host of destructive possibilities and
actualities. Deforestation is only a stop along the way of most mines.
Given the above, the question must be asked, ―Does civilization, by its nature, require the
theoretically infinite consumption, and thus, destruction, of the biosphere?‖ or simply, ―Is, or
can, civilization ever be sustainable?‖ If it can be shown that, on a theoretical level,
civilization—even in its most ideal sense—requires and is predicated on the mass destruction of
the natural world, then the conclusion of abandonment—of abandoning the project of
civilization—is undeniable. However, simply showing that this is the invariable consequence or
―ends‖ of civilization is clearly not enough. If our experience tells us otherwise, if the ―threat‖ of
destruction that comes with maintaining civilization is not apparent, then the task would be to
analyze the structures of our experience in order to uncover and illuminate the truth of our
situation. However, I should first explain what is meant by ―civilization.

13

CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS MEANT BY CIVILIZATION?21
There are a number of definitions that have been given throughout the course of history,
most of which include an implicit justification for the concept they are defining. So rather than
unquestioningly assume these definitions, I think it may be appropriate to first explore the
etymological genesis of the term ―civilization‖ and from there move to a few definitions whose
premises, I believe, are demonstrably accurate.
The term ―civilization‖ can be traced through a number of words back to the latin word
civitatis, meaning ―city-state‖ (with this term finding its conceptual root in the greek polis).
There are a few things to be noted here. First, there is the implied reference to some notion of a
―city,‖ which further implies a society whose way of life is characterized, fundamentally, by its
sedentariness. Secondly, is a reference to a state-based form of governance. Within both of these,
there are a number of generative qualities to be mentioned that make up what we know as
civilization. However, before getting to those qualities, I would like to offer up a few definitions.
The first is that given by famed utilitarian philosopher John Stewart Mill. While he claims to not
conflate it with a kind of ―improvement,‖ Mill defines civilization in terms of what he perceives
as its opposite, ―savagery‖ or ―rudeness or barbarism.‖ ―In savage life,‖ he declares, ―there is no
commerce, no manufactures, no agriculture, or next to none: a country rich in the fruits of
agriculture: commerce, and manufactures, we call civilized.‖ He goes on to declare that ―In
savage communities each person shifts for himself; except in war (and even then very
21

This section is largely a summation of the thoughts and definitions given by a diverse set of thinkers. As such, it
should not be taken as ―original‖ research, per se. Rather, it may serve to signpost and provide clarity to the rest of
the paper and the constant reference to civilization.
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imperfectly), we seldom see any joint operation carried on by the union of many; nor do savages,
in general, find much pleasure in each other‘s society.‖22 While Mill‘s account of what is other
than civilization, i.e., ―savagery, has been thoroughly discredited amongst contemporary
anthropologists, it still remains as a dominant cultural narrative. And despite his meager hedging,
Mill clearly privileges and implicitly invokes a kind of ―improvement‖ when describing the
civilized. I think a more appropriate (and perhaps less problematic) definition is offered by
author and environmental activist Derrick Jensen. Civilization, he explains, can be understood as
―a complex of stories, institutions, and artifacts—that both leads to and emerges from the growth
of cities...with cities being defined...as people living more or less permanently in one place in
densities high enough to require the routine importation of food and other necessities of life."23
Jensen goes on to explain that the establishment of the city and state-based governance—the
city-state—means the ―funneling of resources‖ from ―an increasingly exploited countryside‖
back to the ―center's‖ of the city-state.24
Nearly 2400 years ago Plato acknowledged the same pattern in his discussion of the ideal
―polis‖ in The Republic. A city, Plato argues, ―will be more or less impossible to locate...in a
place where it won't need imports.‖25 Thus, through either trade or brute force, the materials and
means to life must be extracted from surrounding areas.26 The inevitable consequence here, then,
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is the running into (to put it lightly) of certain people who perhaps will not be willing to have
their way of life pillaged for the sake of another (I would argue that the same could be said about
nonhuman animals as well). Throughout the latter part of Book II, Plato describes the
fundamental intricacies of a city, noting the necessity of divisions of labor, growth of the
population, and in the appropriation of ―outside‖ resources, the ―origin of war.‖27 The ―origin of
war,‖ based on the need for imported resources was clear enough to Plato, but I think Jensen
does a great job in fleshing out what, exactly, this means. He argues:
Traditional communities do not often voluntarily give up or sell the
resources on which their communities are based until their communities
have been destroyed. They also do not willingly allow their landbases to
be damaged so that other resources—gold, oil, and so on—can be
extracted. It follows that those who want the resources will do what they
can to destroy traditional communities.28

But it is the division of labor that, by many accounts, is one of the defining and
fundamental elements of civilization. I recently came across an old text published by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, in which (then) dean of the College of
Engineering at Cornell University, Dexter S. Kimball, describes the division of labor as ―The
great fundamental principle of all civilizations.‖ He goes on to add that civilization is only made
possible with the ―wide use of division of labor,‖ and is one of the ―methods that has enabled the

German and Greek are apparently the two most likely languages in which Being may be made apparent via
language.)
27
Plato, The Republic, 373e.
28
Jensen, Endgame, ―Premise Two,‖ ix. Also, see Chapter Three on ―The Genesis of Civilization‘s Being Given.‖
This argument will be returned to in Chapter 3 under ―The Genesis of Civilizations Being Given.‖
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engineer to subdue nature and build up civilization‖ (To note, this text was transcribed from a
speech Kimball gave at a dinner in honor of Herbert Hoover.).29
I think the definition of the division of labor offered by philosopher John Zerzan is to the
point and can serve as a reference throughout the rest of this text: In two parts, he describes the
division of labor as, “1. The breakdown into specific, circumscribed tasks for maximum
efficiency of output which constitutes manufacture [sic]; cardinal aspect of production. 2. The
fragmenting or reduction of human activity into separated toil that is the practical root of
alienation; that basic specialization which makes civilization appear and develop.”30 This
organizing principle was primary in ancient Sumeria, Greece, and Egypt, and remains the case in
contemporary civilized society.
There are, however, a few more fundamental features of civilization. One of the most
striking is that of agriculture. Agriculture, coupled with and made possible by the division labor,
is, argues Zerzan, ―the indispensable basis of civilization.‖31 The general opinion within
anthropological research, it seems, also concedes that agriculture or ―domestication‖ plays a
leading role in the formation of ―civilization.‖ Jared Diamond has proposed that agriculture
likely took hold as human communities sought to mitigate the decrease of available food sources
in times of drought. However, it would seem that the necessity of this transition may not be a
kind of absolute rule, given the account of Richard Lee, Professor emeritus of anthropology at
29
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the University of Toronto. Zerzan recalls Lee's observation of ―the Hazda of Tanzania, Filipino
Tasaday, !Kung of Botswana, [and] the Kalahari Desert !Kung San...[as] easily surviving a
serious, several years' drought while neighboring farmers starved.‖32 Granted, these examples are
hedged with circumstances whose specifics may or may not be similar to those roughly 10,000
years ago, they do add reason to reconsider the ―inevitability‖ of agriculture.
In any case, the shift to agriculture gave way to the further and more rigid stratification of
society through the opening up of productionism in areas specific to an, more or less, urban
setting. Here, then, also is the advent of an institutionalized economy. This, perhaps, is what led
Lewis Mumford to call agriculture the beginning of ―manufactured scarcity.‖33 As people
became increasingly specialized in particular production tasks, the ability or know-how to gather
or grow food for oneself diminished (not to mention the fact that those within cities are often too
concerned with particular jobs or other niceties of city life) and a deep reliance was formed on
those who could grow food or owned land to grow food. Thus, immediate relations of unequal
power begin to arise between those who own the means of production, i.e., land, and those who
do not.34 This analysis, while typical of any Marxist or anarchist, is clear enough, but there are
additional implications to the ―adoption‖ of civilized life.
From Jensen‘s definition of civilization, feminist Lierre Keith adds depth; explaining that
the need to import resources essentially means that resources in one particular area, presumably
the immediate area of, and surrounding, the city, have been used up—that there is no longer the
32
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possibility, for whatever reason (soil depletion, species loss, erosion, ―development,‖ etc.), for a
particular tract of land to support existing populations.35
Historically, civilizations have predicated their existence along the lines of infinite
expansion, going from one place to the next extracting resources in each location until its no
longer possible. There exists, in this process, a kind of ―macro-thinking‖ when considering
civilization. That is, the purveyors of civilization go on extracting various resources as if these
resources are of infinite abundance. However, there is simultaneously the ―micro-thought‖ of
scarcity (mentioned by Mumford) which provides the basis of exchange within civilization—an
institutionalized economics, necessarily backed (as even Plato admitted) by a class of specialized
soldiers, police, and the like. Scarcity is seen as a reality along the same lines of expansion. How
is it, then, that these two seemingly incompatible ways of thinking about life have shaped the
state of the world today? I can only reckon it as a strange kind of cognitive dissonance, but
perhaps there are other reasons.
Though it is certainly the case, insofar as the being of civilization requires continued
growth predicated, necessarily, within a theoretical, abstract, and illusory ―infinite,‖ that the
finite, material, Real, biological world that it is situated within, will continue to be ravished. The
present scale at which civilizations continue to expand and consume has had, as I tried to show in
Chapter One, disastrous effects on the planets inhabitants. But again, how is it possible to
conceive a system principled by an infinite, though resting within the finite? Ronnie Hawkins
has framed the situation in the following way by paralleling the ―economic rationality‖ alluded to
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above, with the economist‘s favorite template—a set of Cartesian axes. And just as Descartes
privileged the disembodied cogito, so too did his mathematics. Hawkins argues, that ―built into
this conceptual model is the assumption that, theoretically, any process can proceed on and on
and on forever, and that any quantity can grow and grow and grow forever. When this type of
thinking is applied to the real world, it implies that new subdivisions may expand outward from
population centers indefinitely….‖ She goes on to add that it is precisely this ―Cartesian illusion
of infinitude [that] undergirds the rationalist belief in perpetual economic ‗growth,‘‖ and the odd
pairing of this theory with ―the actual world without much difficulty.‖36 To get at an
understanding of how the world perhaps has come to be seen in this light, we turn now to the
insight of philosophy, though particularly, a philosophy that is known for its focus on our actual,
embodied, being-in-the-world.
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CHAPTER THREE: PHENOMENOLOGY OF CIVILIZATION
In much of the current discourse surrounding ―environmental issues,‖ there is the
tendency to suggest that we may somehow stave off environmental catastrophe—that ecological
crisis has not yet arrived and there is still time to avert such crisis. This discourse assumes, 1)
that crisis is not yet present, 2) that the collective ―we‖ (inclusive of governing and economic
structures) can, in fact, change to ―avert‖ this crisis, and 3) that the present standards and ways of
being, which may be generally named as ―civilized,‖ can continue with a slight tweaking, i.e.,
that they are compatible with a sustainable future.37 The task of the following sections is to
examine in greater detail these assumptions, especially regarding the compatibility of civilization
and a sustainable future. The first section will explore how it is that we experience, interpret, and
perceive ecological crisis (relative to the descriptions outlined in Chapter One) as presented via
the natural sciences. I will also examine the functioning, formation, and maintenance of certain
interpretative structures. Following that, I will attempt to outline that which is actually ―doing‖
the forming and maintaining, paying special attention to the notion of the modes of givenness of
things in the world as well what the notion of ―world‖ may entail. Here, further insight into
assumption (1) will be given by examining some of the ontological suppositions held by the
dominant view. As a method heralding a ―radical‖ understanding of experience, perception, and
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thinking, elements from the various strata of the phenomenological tradition will be given
precedence throughout this chapter.
My assumption in pursuing a phenomenological understanding of civilization is two-fold.
First, the above mentioned facts—especially those concerning extinction—pose a fundamental
threat not only to particular ―beings,‖ but also to any notion of Being that is not largely
determined, ordered, and administered. At stake is the limiting of the possibility of Being‘s
unhindered and free ―presencing‖ through and within beings. In a more direct sense, the context
in which beings may actually be—where they are open and free from being ordered into, as
Heidegger put it, ―standing reserve‖—is being systematically destroyed. Accordingly, the
question, if one accepts the premise that sentient life needs clean air, clean water, and a thriving
land-base, and further, that the built-imperative for the continual expansion of civilization
threatens these three elements, is ―Why do we continue to allow such activity to take place?‖ Part
of the reason, I think, is that many of us have no clue that such destruction is even happening (or
that it‘s on such enormous scale so as to be experientially invisible), nor do we consider that this
destruction might actually be a requisite part of civilization as such.
Indeed, as many have pointed out, ―From the point of view of everyday life, all threats are
not equal.‖38 We do not necessarily react to the threat of being mugged the same way we react to
the threat of the destruction of the oceans. We perceive them differently. Different threats speak
to us—our being-in-the-world—in different ways. Though the problem, again, is why some of
the direst threats facing human and nonhuman communities are ignored or even sometimes
denied outright and, when or if they are acknowledged, that there is often a complete aversion to
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pressing the historical genesis of such threats. ―The problem‖ treads the waters of a
phenomenological/existential ontology: Is our understanding of ―Being‖ one that that is so
impoverished as to discount the possibility of non-being? Civilizations, as I noted earlier, assume
a model of infinite growth and, in doing so, are much like the individual who, being so
(unknowingly) caught up in the everyday—what Heidegger would call ―inauthentic being‖—
forgets or ―flees‖ the prospects of his finitude and the acknowledgment that, indeed, one day he
too will die.
My second, and perhaps more important, reason in assuming, loosely, a
phenomenological method is the issue of interpretation, particularly though, of how we perceive,
interpret, and understand experience and Being from our situatedness within civilization. It is in
the exploration of this issue that I think some direction regarding the pragmatic concerns of
―what now?‖ will be most apparent as well as an understanding of the general shape of the
current discourse regarding crisis.
Opening our interpretation or understanding of ―civilization‖ as a problem presents
difficulties, as it is so fundamentally close and, in many cases, constitutive of our experiential
content that it easily escapes reflection or consideration as ―problem.‖ In a phenomenological
sense, civilization as that which occupies the directedness or aboutness—the intentional
―thing‖—of consciousness cannot make itself apparent or ―present‖ without considerable and
deliberate effort (And even then, its apprehension by consciousness is never ―total,‖ yet its
general essence can, I think, be grasped.) What‘s more, in this closeness civilization holds, rather
undeservedly, a kind of tacit justification. The task of the last section is to uncover this closeness
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and justification. It is in the uncovering of civilization as problem that responses to the question
of ―what now?‖ may be most responsibly dealt with.
Situated Meaning, Significance, and Experience
The facts I have included thus far, while striking in one sense, are ―read‖—they are
understood in one sense—but they are not experienced. Or, they are experienced in some sense,
but only intermittently before the ―everyday‖ stakes its claim. This problem of experience is the
most direct corollary to the problem of perception regarding the destruction of the biosphere. Per
this problem of perception, which makes inroads into the way certain events, statements, and
experiences are interpreted, civilization, as a seemingly omnipresent force—a totality of sorts—
may be seen as constitutive of a highly rigid, yet concealed, hermeneutical lens.
For example, where a member of the West Papuan Kamoro tribe may, without much
reflection, see the vast expanses of jungle as home (to both themselves and other beings), the
civilized settler perhaps, in a similar mode, sees land-value, possibilities for ―development,‖ and
―resources.‖ The case of the settler is curious because, while both he and the tribesman may be
viewing the same area, the settler‘s intentional gaze is turned, perhaps immediately, towards an
elaborate abstract idealization informed by the inner logic of a particular history that would,
necessarily, be the breadth of settler/civilized society. Not only is the ontology different between
the primitive and the civilized, but also, this differentiation may be traced back to the very
interpretative structure that gave rise to one ontology or the other.39
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Civilization—its history, structure, and institutions—acts as a mediating and dividing
―force‖ between ―the things themselves,‖ inserting the disembodied logic of expansion and
appropriation into an overall interpretative schema. Without this interpretative schema the settler,
the purveyor of civilization, would not be as such. That is, the appearance of the jungle or
mountain, while an open space that affords the fluid presencing and abscencing of Being into
varying possibilities for both humans and nonhumans, affords, for the settler, a limited set of
abstractions: property, ―resources‖ to funnel back to civilization, and other similarities derived
from the needs of a particular civilization. The interpretative structure most according to
civilization involves what is immediate and in-itself (but not known in-itself) being swept up into
abstraction, divorced from an embodied context, and reduced and confined to civilizations
predetermined use-value. The built-in ontology of civilization, like one of its founding elements,
the division of labor, is to fragment and alienate beings and possible modes of Being—to create
an ever deepening chasm between lived experience and represented shells or corpses—of such
experience. But if we can see that this is the case, it seems to follow that we can reinterpret
certain theoretical abstract statements into our own embodied context. Indeed, this is what must
be done.
The observations of extinction and the correlation to (most of) humankind‘s' activities
over the past 10,000 years or so, especially in the past few hundred years, are descriptions cast in
the form of statements describing an ―objective‖ condition of the world, a condition understood
as independent of any kind of abstract representation. Though, getting at this objective condition
requires, in a way, that we frame the content representationally. This is obvious enough; how else
but by representation can we make sense of claims that extend beyond our immediate
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visuospatial frame of reference? In relating to the facts presented in the previous two chapters, it
becomes somewhat problematic in translating these facts into an immediate meaningfulness
apparent in my own being-in-the-world. I say ―problematic‖ because it seems that if these facts
are indeed as dire as I‘ve indicated, the response from people ―in the know‖ has been amazingly
insufficient. There is a ―proportional gap,‖ so to speak, between our responses to such facts and
the depth of the facts themselves. I think part of this ―gap‖ may be due in large part (though not
in total) to an inability to interpret and perceive the objective nature of these facts as having to do
with the everyday world that we experience. Accordingly, it seems likely that this inability may
be attributed to the framing—the situatedness—of what is called objective. In uncovering the
way in which the notion of objectivity is constituted, I think we may gain a firmer grip on the
inner workings that make possible such a gap between the facts presented and our responses to
such facts.
To begin, Husserl‘s analysis of the ―scientific attitude‖ (a part of the more general
―natural attitude‖) offers a way of getting to the bottom of how we understand the objective.
According to Husserl, one working within the scientific attitude is prone to grasp the aspects
included in a description in an objectivistic way (not necessarily ―objective‖), divorcing the
content of the lived experience of an object of description and, instead, imposing abstract
theoretical formulations.40 In this, qualitative features are typically trumped by the abstract and
quantitative, thus making way for the kind of causal determinacy found in some scientific
platforms (usually, those appropriated into a political-economic schema). Aside from Husserl
(and for the sake of the overall context of this text), I think it may be helpful to understand the
40
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scope of the attitude described as being directed toward the achievement of predictability
(especially when situated within the political-economic; the more predictable the outcome, the
greater the profit, power, and dominance). The privileging of quantitative abstraction, or the
privileging of any theoretical abstraction for that matter, is, in part, the target of a
phenomenological investigation.
In the epilogue to The Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology II, Husserl describes a
―transcendental intersubjectivity...in which the real world is constituted as Objective, as being for
‗everybody.‘‖41 Paraphrasing Husserl's conclusion, David Abram remarks that the prevalent
notion of objectivity is ―a theoretical construction, an unwarranted idealization of intersubjective
experience.‖42 The fundamental element of the ―objective‖ is, according to the
phenomenologists, found in the agreement and interaction between perspectives.43 The ―solidity‖
and consistency that we experience and attribute to the world is, then, on account of our
―continual encounter with others, with other embodied subjects, other centers of experience.‖44
But, clearly, if our understanding of the objective is situated in this way, how then do we explain
the apparent mass denial of the reality of facts that directly imply the extinction of thousands of
species and, correlatively, the possible extinction of those interpreting such facts?
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I think part of the answer may be found in Heidegger‘s notion of das Man (or ―the They,‖
―The One,‖ or just ―One‖). Das Man is the designation applied to those who we encounter in the
everyday. They are, as Heidegger points out, who we encounter in public transportation, when
we read the newspaper, and I would add, when watching the television (particularly in the
descriptions of others given by news anchors and other ―reporters‖). Heidegger is quick to point
out that das Man is ―nothing definite,‖ yet it is in this ―inconspicuousness and unascertainability‖
that ―the they unfolds its true dictatorship‖ and ―prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.‖45
Thus, as Heidegger goes on to explain, there is a hold and a claim by das Man that governs, in
some sense, the norms of what is acceptable and what is not. In this way, when we hear of some
environmental catastrophe on the news, say the recent BP oil spill, we are immediately hindered
in our response by the norm of das Man. We cannot act or judge in a manner that is appropriate
to the catastrophe. Instead, after the nightly news has covered the bit on the oil spill, the
broadcast moves along, unflinchingly, into the latest celebrity break-up or scandal. Here,
response to catastrophe is muzzled and the depth of the situation seemingly paired, as a matter of
priority, with one of the most inane obsessions of contemporary civilized life. The truth of the
situation and the responses appropriate to such situations, whether oil spill, deforestation,
extinction and so forth is concealed by the imposing norm of das Man and the general
everydayness that we often find ourselves in. As Heidegger puts it, the ―public-ness‖ constituted
by das Man ―controls every way in which the world and Dasein are interpreted.‖46
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But there is also a deeper aspect of the interpretation of these facts, especially when we
consider individuals who seem to grasp the meaningfulness of such facts in a way that is directly
relevant to an embodied material reality—one that the perceiver comprehends as being situated
within, as being a part of. As I mentioned earlier, part of the task of this section is to examine
how scientific facts are experienced—to examine how an apparently non-normative statement is
translated into a meaningful and value-laden experience. So when I tell my friend Steve that X
amount of species are going extinct every year because of human activity, he, without much
hesitation, replies something to effect of ―Oh, that's awful.‖ Now, this response could just be
characteristic of the company I keep, but the point is to illustrate that we can think of instances
where individuals respond in normative ways to statements that carry no normative signposts.
To answer the question of why Steve and others would have this or a similar reaction, I
think an appeal may be made to a fundamental level of what, in Heidegger's understanding, is a
defining element of our humanness: our implicit concern with ―Being.‖ Here, Heidegger's
concept of ―Dasein,‖ as that being for which ―being is an issue,‖ plays an integral role in how we
may approach an experience of the truth and implications of certain scientific claims.47 While
being qua being is perhaps an issue for humans, it is only in the context of a lived material world
that Being may ―appear‖ or beings may actually ―be.‖48 This is not to discount any notion of,
say, ―spiritual‖ aspects of being, only that, as far as we can experience, perceive, and know, the
understanding of our being is informed by an embodied and, necessarily, material, perspective.
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When we describe something pertaining to experience or perception, our description is
imbued with terms that invoke a particular sense—what is heard, seen, felt, smelled, tasted, and
so forth. The context where these descriptions gain sense, meaning or are in any way rendered
intelligible, as I've already noted, includes the access to clean air, clean water, and land that can
support a biologically diverse population. If these elements, which are constitutive of the context
in which ―Being,‖ in its most unfettered sense is made possible, are restricted, then the ability for
beings to be is, in one sense, also restricted. Though, more troublesome are the increased
strictures placed on the possibilities of such beings through their subjection to an increasingly
narrowed ―revealing‖ and monolithic sense of Being as such—perhaps what Heidegger describes
as ―challenging forth.‖
In acknowledging the possibility of such restriction, we also at the same time,
acknowledge the converse of Being, that is, non-being or not-being. As Being is of issue for us,
the same also applies (or ought to apply) to that of the possibility of non-being. As Paul Tillich
remarks, ―Our ultimate concern,‖ that which we surrender to and is the fundamental mark of
―care‖ in our existence that supersedes all ―preliminary concerns,‖ ―is that which determines our
being or not-being.‖49 While the term ―being‖ as understood by Tillich relates to ―the whole of
human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence,‖ the context in which this
being is conceived, again, cannot be divorced the material-biological, embodied reality that
makes even the most unassuming consideration of Being possible (nor, despite Tillich‘s silence
on the issue, should this notion of Being be reserved solely in the context of humans). In
recognizing the aspect of non-being to being, there is, also, the recognition of vulnerability—the
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fragility and finitude—that characterizes all life. As we both perceive and are the ―things‖ of
perception, that is, to perceive we are also situated within a horizon of perception (ourselves or
other50) in the world, this vulnerability is made even clearer. As Robert Kirkman has put it,
echoing the sentiment of Merleau-Ponty, ―Vulnerability is the price of perception.‖51
If the ―threat of non-being‖ is ―implied in existence‖52 as the counterpart, in some sense,
of Being, the task at hand, again, is to reflect on the immediacy and magnitude of this threat as it
may be revealed in certain scientific, objective statements. And while it may seem odd to
differentiate between varieties of orientation toward non-being (that is, whether we or others
―pass into‖ non-being through either catastrophic climate change, a lack of fertile land, and so
forth), especially if we consider Heidegger's dictum that we are all ―beings-toward-death,‖ the
redeeming factor in this distinguishing may be found in the notions of care, meaning, and
involvement with the world and beings in the world. That is, how our life may be oriented
toward death in one way as opposed to another is differentiated between qualitative degrees of
involvement. For example, we could, on one hand, live our entire lives in relative isolation in,
say, a window-less prison or, on the other hand, in and amidst the vibrant and diverse ecosystem
of the Australian Gondwana rainforests. Perhaps that is not the clearest example, but the point
here is this: despite the fact that we and other inhabitants of this planet will die (and indeed the
planet itself being engulfed by the Sun), it does not follow that our qualitative involvement—our
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care and concern—ought to be so diminished as to constrain and limit the open possibilities for
Being‘s presencing in our lives and the lives of others (humans or nonhumans).
If individuals/groups conduct themselves according to how they experience the world, as
R.D. Laing and others have argued, and if this experience is the experience of a totality of objects
whose being is significant only insofar as a calculated use value, then it follows that the behavior
of such individuals or institutions will be governed, fundamentally, by an understanding (in
whatever form; pre-ontologically, implicitly, explicitly, etc.) of Being that is idealist and
irrevocably delusional regarding the material world. This delusion is clear in light of the remarks
of Chapter Two regarding the tendency of civilization to predicate its existence along the lines
of, theoretically, infinite expansion/consumption within the strictures of a clearly finite
biological-world. In the same way that the denial or refusal to acknowledge ones own finitude
results in a kind of ―inauthentic‖ being or the being of the everyday (Heidegger)53, the refusal to
acknowledge the finitude of the earth also produces a way of being that conceals the truth of
what the everyday of civilization implies and requires, i.e., ―endless‖ growth and consumption at
the expense of being and countless beings (both human and non-human).
Our understanding is rooted, necessarily, in the interpretative structures of our being. That
is, the make up of our experiential horizons (as Gadamer would have it) or the sum total of our
historical-being, is constitutive to some extent of the way we interpret our being in the world as
well as the ―world‖ as such. It is not, however, necessarily determinate of the truth-content of
certain interpretations and conclusions. To reflect on our understanding—trying to understand
our understanding—shifts our being from everyday ―thrownness‖ and into something seemingly

53 We could also cite Sartre's notion of ―bad-faith‖ in a similar sense.
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much more critical and holistic. This is, perhaps, especially true when we begin to consider the
finitude and fragility of others and ourselves.
To return to the aspect of environmental discourse I mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter that supposes environmental catastrophe may be ―prevented,‖ it may be argued that this
sort of talk is mistaken if it can be shown that ―catastrophe‖ is precisely what we are involved in.
The prevalence of speaking or thinking about ecological crisis as if it has not ―arrived,‖ may be
explained by noting that one‘s everyday experience doesn't seem to confirm some of the more
daunting globally-scaled statistics regarding the destruction of the biosphere. When we walk
outside, the threat of, say, climate change or an oil spill, does not present itself in or on our
horizon of experience in the same way that a more ―immediate‖ threat is experienced (unless, of
course, one happens to be in the middle of a melting glacier, an oil-drenched beach, or the like).
We can point back to an explanation of this type of perception in Heidegger‘s das Man, though
to illustrate this interpretative phenomenon further, Slavoj Zizek offers the following insight.
Speaking from what looks like a landfill/dump of discarded household and industrial
items, Zizek describes this process: When we read something of the impending and possible
―doom‖ scenario, and then we step outside and see; immediately, our experience is of ―not what
things you see behind me,‖ gesturing towards the mounds of waste, but ―nice things…nice trees,
birds singing and so on.‖ So even though we have read the bits about ecological destruction and
so forth, our experienced reality in that moment of stepping out is not one of comprehending the
possible total annihilation of such an experience. We are utterly incapable, to some extent, Zizek
argues, to conceive of this sort of destruction. As Zizek says, it is almost unimaginable. We are
involved in what he and other psychoanalysts call the ―logic of disavowal‖ (―I know very well,
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but nevertheless...‖) wherein we may know that the maintenance of civilization is, in the end,
catastrophic for the earth and civilization itself, yet we continue to act in the world as if we do
not know because this ―end‖ is in some sense inconceivable.54 But this is not to argue that the
situation is indeed absolutely ―inconceivable,‖ only that in the failure to properly negotiate the
theoretical perspective from and with a limited, necessarily, embodied perspective, such
catastrophe seems impossible.
Kirkman describes a similar process, noting that in the objectivist language used in the
presentation of many ecological threats or catastrophes, we are given, by way of our everyday
experience, what he calls ―plausible deniability.‖ Speaking on the threats presented by climate
change, Kirkman argues that, ―the processes that drive the climate seem remote from us in time
and space, and so we go about our lives attending to what seem to us to be more immediate and
pressing threats...‖55 These more immediate threats are those that, in some way, touch on our
being in the everyday. Thus, if in the everyday the threats alluded to by certain scientific findings
bear, seemingly, no relevance in my daily business, I hardly have reason or occasion to reflect on
their depth and implications, nor will I likely recognize and qualify what, in any other sense,
would be understood as crisis. Again, this ―plausible deniability‖ thrives only in the failure to
―ride the cusp,‖ as N. Katherine Hayles has put it, of the ego-allocentric positions (i.e., the
considering, simultaneously, of wide reaching theoretical findings and one‘s embodied
perspective). This, of course, brings up the question of why this failure occurs at all. This
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question will be dealt with in the following sub-section and then again, in a more robust sense in
Chapter Four.
By maintaining that a crisis may be averted and that it is not the present state of affairs,
our interpretation of the present will defer what qualifies as crisis from the material-biological
world to the idealist-economic-civilized ―world.‖ This, again, has to do with the structures of
interpretation, intersubjectively situated, that impart or recognize the meaning of the being of the
world; in this case, either as material, physical, embodied, and finite, or as idealist, economic,
disembodied, and infinite. Though if the position that ecological catastrophe has not yet arrived
would still like to be maintained, the burden of proof must then rest on a definition of catastrophe
that is far greater in scope and magnitude than heretofore established. However, the mass
extinction of various species, the sterilization of the oceans, and the deforesting of entire
continents seems hard to top.
The Given and the World

If the above is any indication, our interpretations of certain events, as well as the
perceived ―situation‖ from which we interpret, is largely governed by our particular ontological
understandings. It is unimportant whether the ontology is explicitly outlined by those
interpreting, only that it is recognized that there are certain backgrounded notions that predicate
existential and ontological qualities to our understanding of the world. It is, for most of us,
civilization that forms the backgrounding or the ―enframing‖ of our involvement and
understanding in and of the world. It constitutes and mediates our direction and relation with
nearly every facet of our experience with the world. The mechanisms of production, division of

35

labor and so forth, are present in everything from our food, our clothing, the places we live, the
way we communicate, our jobs (or the notion of ―job‖ itself)—almost every part of our lives is
mediated and enframed by the products and institutions of civilization.56 Heidegger describes
enframing as the way that we shape the world around us (primarily in the use technology and,
correlatively/dialectically, the way technology ―uses‖ us) and, as such, this turns to the way we
interpret certain occurrences and events within the ―frame.‖ Indeed, the ―frame‖ in our
experience is concealed as ―frame‖ and instead, takes on the status of the everyday, which in
turn, appears as an ahistorical, natural totality whose being, thus, seems impervious to
questioning. Within this everyday our involvement with the world—with others—may be
considered, then, markedly ―civilized.‖ It may also be argued that through this perception the
interpretation and experienced meaning of certain experiences is often, but not determinately,
hedged with the implied intersubjective cultural meanings and values of the context
(civilization).
I've appealed in the above sections to the ―external‖ world, the earth, though in the early
conceptions of a phenomenological method, the ―phenomenological reduction‖ or the
―bracketing‖ (epoché) of the external world was said to open up the space for shedding naïve
philosophical beliefs and scientific or cultural constructions and, instead, focus on how certain
ideas/things are ―presented‖ in consciousness. The reduction, insofar as Eugen Fink and Husserl
explain it, does not involve the rejection/denial of certain things (nor their explicit affirmation),
but instead, calls us to question what we assume in the everyday. Husserl and Fink described the
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being of this ―everyday‖ as ―the-captivation-in-an-acceptedness,‖ that is, the ―acceptedness‖ of
the unexamined everyday that we are somehow held ―captive‖ to.57
The ―given,‖ once one has bracketed the validity and traditional foundations of all other
knowledge, is, traditionally, consciousness. Here, the insight by Husserl and others (namely,
Brentano) is that consciousness is typically understood as having a kind of ―intentional
structure.‖ ―Intentionality‖ can be described as consciousness of or about something (with
consciousness including perception, interpretation, judgment, thinking, etc.). The ―things‖ that
consciousness may be directed towards, then, must always trace back to a referencing of ―world‖
(That is, by virtue of their ―appearing‖ or being shown somewhere and, additionally, being
perceived from somewhere. This is what also gives rise to the intersubjective basis of
objectivity.).58 There are at least three things to note here. First, ―things‖ in the
phenomenological sense are not the inanimate physical objects of everyday discourse, but rather,
may be understood as that which is experienced, perceived, thought, sensed, and so on. The
―thing‖ may be a physical material thing, but it also includes ideas of temporality, spatial
relations, love, and really any-thing that is the ―of‖ or ―about.‖ Secondly and similarly, the
―world‖ includes ―not just the physical environment, but the social and cultural world, which
may include things that do not exist in a physical way.‖59 Thus, it is noted that in the disclosure
of consciousness [(inter)subjectivity] via phenomenological reduction, there is already ―world‖
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as pre-given.60 But this ―world,‖ as given or pre-given, is not the object of intentionality,
necessarily, though it may be ―seen‖ by noting that one, in fact, is seeing ―from somewhere.‖61
And, as Gadamer has pointed out, ―there is such a thing as givenness that is not itself the object
of intentional acts.‖62 The reduction, then, does not involve the Cartesian prioritization of the
isolated subject—the res cogitans—(as it directly appeals to the non-constituted ―given‖ world)
but rather, as Dan Zahavi puts it, it allows us to ―make those intentional threads that attach us to
the world visible by slacking them slightly.‖63 We may again note that this includes at least a
nuanced understanding of ―world.‖ The third part to notice here, as Heidegger observed, is that in
the ―reduction,‖ the apprehension of beings in the world leads us ―to the understanding of the
being of this being‖ and not, as Husserl may have had it, to a constitutive apprehension of such
beings. In other words, the being of a being does not rest in my attributing (constituting) being to
a being. Instead, the being of a being persists regardless of my perceiving it or not.
So as we ―slack the threads‖ in the reduction and begin to see and understand things in
ways that may part from our everyday understanding of such things, we are forced to reckon with
some understanding of these ―threads‖ and, thus, the ―world‖—the context of the ―things‖ of
intentionality. This involves, then, the initial bracketing of the validity of what our theoretical
understanding of ―world‖ may be and, instead, move to account for its appearance as the given or
the backgrounding of intentional things. It has already been noted that there are both socio-
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culture and natural-physical ―environmental‖ aspects in considering the world, but to elaborate, it
must also be noted that in our understanding of each of these (or as a non-totalizing ―whole‖)
both aspects are intimately intertwined. However, given that an almost undeniable case has been
made for consciousness as embodied (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gallagher, Zahavi, et. al.), I
think we may argue for an understanding of the world that permits for a ―primacy‖ of the natural.
This does not mean a turn to naturalism as such, but it does recognize the material aspects
involved in consciousness and the primacy of the ―world‖ whose invariable essence is material,
i.e., that which transcends and makes possible the context of certain social and cultural aspects of
the world. Here, we needn't appeal, necessarily, to any overtly theoretical understanding of
world, scientific or not, though what may be helpful is to uncover what can be considered the
―pre-theoretical‖ aspects given in reflection (phenomenological or otherwise).
These pre-theoretical aspects have been noted already, except they have not been
qualified as such, they are (again): breathable (clean) air, clean water, and a landbase that may be
considered ―healthy‖ in the widest sense. These three elements have an immediate appearance in
my understanding as being the fundamental ―threads‖ that ―attach‖ me to the world and as such,
they are immediately meaningful.64 They are the invariable components of the essence of my
embodied existence. Through my lived experience I cannot, by any means of bracketing, deny
the quality of these elements as intrinsic to existence. They are, in a sense, the self-evident
axioms of existence. To state the patently obvious: imagine the absence of one of these elements
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in as ―absolute‖ a sense as possible. To then predicate ―life‖ as compatible with the absence of
one of these elements would be impossible. I am, of course, attached through many other
mediums, but a reduction of those mediums and a consideration of their embodied context,
requires that I acknowledge the primacy of the above three elements. I do not need to know the
structural scientific differences in any of these elements for their existence to have significance
and meaning. These elements, then, capture an understanding of what is, properly speaking,
―given.‖ I have clarified our understanding of ―world‖ mostly in terms of its ontic qualities, but
these qualities are also what make possible its ontological conception. Thus, we may understand
the world in either an ontic or ontological sense, or in the play between the two as the conclusion
of a properly eidetic, yet not necessarily idealist, reduction.
A large problem of this work arises here and rests in positing the primacy—the
(pre)givenness—of the ―natural‖ (ontic) world from within the frame of what is civilized, i.e., the
socio-culture world. To diffuse this problem, I will try to clarify and distinguish the use of the
terms ―pre-given‖ and ―given.‖ The natural world, as I've explained, makes possible the cultural
world. The social-cultural world—the ―lifeworld‖—for nearly all humans, is ―colonized,‖ to
borrow Habermas's terminology, by the civilized. Here, the civilized, as I've said, mediates
cultural, social, and natural experience, perception, sensing, and thus, understanding. Through
this mediation/colonization there is, then, the tendency to understand civilization, in a very
fundamental sense, as ―given.‖ Though civilization may be construed in one sense as given, it
may in another more fundamental sense, be viewed as ―phenomenon‖ (in the sense that
Heidegger explained it). ―As that which shows itself in itself, the manifest‖65, civilization is not
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―shown‖ in a direct sense, but is, rather, that which opens up the horizon and possibilities for
―beings as such to appear‖ (Though, to note, the ―opening up‖ involved with civilization is not to
be taken as a kind of fluid ―openness.‖ Its ―possibilities‖ are, as I described earlier, largely
confined, administered, and controlled.)66 The being of civilization, then, is considered upon first
glance, ―hidden.‖ What is seen at first is not ―civilization‖ as such, but rather, the collective
―things‖ of civilization.
However, the being of those beings that civilization makes possible comes at the expense
of the ability and possibility of other beings to ―be,‖ as I've been saying. In this, the
understanding of civilization as phenomenon must also include the corollary understanding of
what I would like to call ―anti-phenomenon,‖ as its horizonal ―offspring‖ threatens to undermine
that which made their ―being‖ possible in the first place, that is, the ―context‖ mentioned earlier.
And it is here where civilization must cede its claim as what is fundamentally given to that which
facilitated its being in the first place: the biosphere, the ecosphere, call it what you will—the
earth. In this light, the earth is both the pre-given phenomenon of the ―given‖ of civilization but
also, in some sense, the ―true‖ and most ―absolute‖ given of what makes beings possible.
However, I still have not examined why it is the case, from the standpoint of everyday
life, that civilization is seen as more fundamental—more given—than what I've alluded to in the
above. How is it that an ontological understanding of the world, from the civilized standpoint, is
conceived at the neglect and, in a natural-material sense, expense of the ontic? It seems
disingenuous to any ―thorough‖ quest for uncovering the meaning of the being of civilization if
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we disregard the ontical nature of such understanding. That is, as it has been argued, we cannot
bracket the validity of our embededness in the natural-material world. Why, then, do the
promoters and progenitors of civilization, continue to act and argue as if this embededness could
be escaped or doesn't exist at all? To answer, the following section will attempt to sketch out the
typical scenario in which the civilized have, traditionally, staked their claim and what this means
for how we see or do not see the being of civilization.
The Genesis of Civilization's Being Given
Premise 2: Traditional communities do not often voluntarily give up or sell the resources on
which their communities are based until their communities have been destroyed. They also do
not willingly allow their landbases to be damaged so that other resources—gold, oil, and so on—
can be extracted. It follows that those who want the resources will do what they can to destroy
traditional communities.
–Derrick Jensen, Endgame
The being of civilization, often perceived as given, is not ahistorical, though its
permeation into the everyday attitude appeals implicitly to such a status. Consider the degree to
which institutions, those of a particular brand of social construction, i.e., laws, credit, property,
money, etc. function as ―directing‖ forces in everyday life. So as not to give these particular
institutions undue worth or to naïvely condemn them, let's be clear on the fundamental reason as
to why these institutions hold sway: In a word, they claim a monopoly on the right to control and
distribute the material-biological means to sustaining life (as it concerns both humans and nonhumans), bolstering (in the case of humans) this monopoly with an elaborate system of social
reward and punishment. In a sense, civilized institutions hold hostage the material means to life
and, in doing so, take on the appearance as necessary, justified, and thus as a ―given‖ inevitable
part of life. But the authoritative force of these institutions is less in their ability hold the
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appearance of free standing justification (that is, apart from the referencing of conditions that
have been a result of the activity of such institutions to begin with) and more with their ability to
maintain and control the means to life.67
There is a dialectical aspect to note regarding the civilizing process. Namely, in being
situated within civilization, the institutions that facilitate this civilizing are, in essence, designed
to perpetuate and further a particular way of being by explicitly encouraging the replication of
this way of being and destroying or limiting others. And by ―encouraging‖ I mean, ―forcefully
ensuring.‖ This is clear enough, but an illustration of this perpetuation/replication may be found
in briefly mentioning a few aspects of the global food system (amongst other pervasive systems).
Only a few companies control the majority of food and food production in the world.
Their methods of production are demonstrably unsustainable (deforestation, oceanic dead-zones,
top-soil depletion, a ―make-or-break‖ reliance on petroleum, etc.). However, in drawing out how
this particular way of being is systematically replicated and perpetuated, an appeal may be made
to the earlier mentions of objectivity and its intersubjective roots. If the possibilities for
conceiving and then enacting a way of feeding oneself (apart from the dominant industrialized
system) are destroyed or the conditions for such conceiving/enacting are radically impaired, the
impression is then given that the dominant system is the only—that is, objective—possibility for
feeding oneself, no matter if it is unsustainable (likely, denial or a refusal to acknowledge this
unsustainability will marginalize any critique by appealing to the ―objective‖ ―here and now‖ of
feeding oneself, or maintaining profit margins and keeping jobs). The destruction of possibilities,
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in the sense used here, means the physical and actual destruction or limiting of the ability to
deviate from industrial food production. Whether through the depletion of soil such that only by
way of industrial chemicals will anything grow, the paving over of mass tracts of land (or being
situated in an area that simply cannot sustain life without an industrial infrastructure, e.g., much
of the west and south west U.S.), the social conditions such that only the rich or moderately welloff may afford sustainably grown food, or to cite a foundational structure of civilization
mentioned earlier, a well regulated division of labor such that only ―experts‖ are permitted or
have the know-how to grow food (this brings the further problem of the hegemony of particular
agricultural methods), the shift away from the everyday given of the grocery store—of industrial
food production—is rendered almost unthinkable for most us.
The realm of the unthinkable, or even the ―construction‖ of the unthinkable (as
paradoxical as that sounds), is precisely where the driving forces of civilization stake their claim.
By pushing non-civilized ―systems‖—ways of thinking or being—into this realm of the
unthinkable, there is a twofold (at least) reaction. The first, as I mention above, is the claim to
objectivity. The second, and perhaps more important aspect, is the act of forgetting. As a ―thing‖
is made unthinkable or ways of being similarly so, these things and this ―being‖ are also, in some
sense, forgotten. Its ability to be reckoned as a possible way of being is, like the thousands of
nonhuman species every year, virtually extinct.
To abstract this process, we may say that through the limiting or forced exclusion of
certain possibilities, a claim on the objective truth of a created situation is made. This is precisely
the method of domination that, historically, has been employed by civilized empires in their
appropriation of the land and ―resources‖—the homes—of ―primitive‖ and indigenous people
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groups. The example of Louisiana based mining company Freeport-McMoRan and their
activities in the Indonesian province of West Papua serves to illustrate this point.
The West Papuan tribes of the Amungme and Kamoro have, historically, relied on the
waters and landbase surrounding the site of the Grasberg mine, the worlds largest gold mine and
the third largest copper mine. It is also one of the largest open pit mines in the world. The
activity required to sustain mining operations at Grasberg has led to the systematic destruction of
the surrounding ecosystem.68, 69 The dumping of what is known as ―tailings,‖ a toxic waste
product from processed ore (an illegal practice in almost all ―developed‖ countries), has
destroyed somewhere around 89 square miles of the lowland ecosystem surrounding the Ajkwa
River.70 As such, the possibilities of the Amungme and Kamoro for maintaining a traditional
way of life are on the chopping block, so to speak, of Freeport-McMoRan and other company
stakeholders. But this limiting, according the Freeport CEO Jim Bob Moffet, is no limiting at all.
In fact, with the creation of jobs and Freeport-funded schools, the ―natives‖ Moffet, argues are
far better off. Here, we can certainly recall the perceptual differences between primitive and
settler mentioned earlier.
This ―bettering‖ is a classic argument that has been employed by occupying forces,
colonizers, and the like for centuries. After the way of living of certain cultures has been
destroyed—typically by cutting off their traditional means of survival—the indigenous, or what‘s
left of them, are coerced into assimilation. There is nothing voluntary about the situation created
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by the world's colonizers. Civilization is and has been the systematic constraining of perceptions
and understandings that resist idealism, abstraction, rigidly senseless hierarchy, and a fetishizing
of ―work‖ and ―development.‖ In the course of history, there is not one civilization that has
arisen without the ―aid‖ of slavery, an overly exploited landbase, and the general impetus to
forcibly impose the rigid strictures of a stratified society. Not one. All have been formed and
maintained through systematic violence against both human and nonhuman communities.71 The
burden of proof for this claim rests with those who would wish to deny it. If there's any doubt
that the method of civilized expansion does not function or has not functioned historically in a
similar manner (in every case), recall the european settlement of North and South America, the
ancient conquests of Rome, or the warring kingdoms of the ancient mid-east. In every instance, it
has followed the same trajectory.
Legitimation
―People only want all this stuff [Big Macs, Coke, Oprah, etc.] after their own culture has been
destroyed.‖
–Derrick Jensen, Endgame72
The products and institutions of civilization are the ―evidence,‖ at least prima facie, for
the justification of civilization. These justifications are explicit appeals, at least when the
―defense‖ is situated within civilization, to our everyday experience. Most especially, and in a
radically reductive sense, the appeals are made to food, water, and housing (these are further
compounded by appeals to certain ―advanced‖ technology, with ―advanced‖ being synonymous
with ―good‖ whilst somehow also maintaining the alleged neutrality of technology as such). I
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aim to show that the legitimation assumed by the civilized ethos is resolutely circular yet steeped
in a genesis-like mythos. This myth, then, not only tends to be self-referential but, also,
progressively self-serving, that is, it feeds back into itself in order to expand, replicate, and
justify itself. For the following argument, I will focus on analyzing civilized justifications from a
loose phenomenological standpoint, that is, by bracketing the assumed validity of everyday
justifications and, instead, move toward a more eidetic understanding of what it is that would
qualify or undermine the given justifications. This is all assuming, of course, that one is actually
seeking a justification.
Part of ―the problem of civilization‖ is that it is difficult to even conceptualize civilization
as a problem. Admittedly, when I had first heard of folks like John Zerzan and Derrick Jensen
pinpointing most of the world‘s problems on civilization as such, I dismissed the analysis.
Having avoided actually reading the work of Zerzan or Jensen, I went on thinking that
civilization has ―given‖ us so many great things—that it had redeeming factors that could far
outweigh the harm being described by those who would condemn civilization. This, in my
experience, has been the normal reaction of one who first hears a general indictment of
civilization as the root of the most significant problems. ―How will we feed ourselves?‖ or ―How
will we get clean water?‖ are often the first responses of those (including myself when I first
encountered the analysis) that recoil at the notion of rejecting civilization. Though consider, for a
moment, what these replies say, implicitly, about the perceived claims of civilization. They are
an appeal to two of the most fundamental elements of our existence. The understanding, or
perceived ―baseline-truth,‖ from which these questions are launched can be stated as follows:
1. Without civilization, there is no food.

47

2. Without civilization, there is no water.
The means to live, then, is perceived as ultimately resting within the grips of civilization. In
some cases, these statements are correct (e.g., the southwest U.S. or areas in which the business
of civilization has destroyed what formerly sustained life), but when they are employed as
justification for the continued being/trajectory of civilization, they are remarkably shortsighted.
To explain this shortsightedness, I've used the following analogy: Suppose you have a whole
chocolate cake. Now, just before you and your friends start to dig into this cake I come along and
take it away. After some time has passed, I return, but only with one slice of cake. However, I've
dressed it with, say, a raspberry glaze and for good measure, a cherry on top. You and your
friends receive the slice with excitement, joy, and thanks, though forgetting, in the meantime,
that just a few moments earlier I took the whole cake away.
Perhaps this analogy is oversimplified, but it seems to get the point across. In more
concrete terms, it is to explain that when we rejoice over the prospect of, for example, getting
cleaner water through our taps because of some new filtration system at the utility company, we
neglect why it is, in the first place, that our water is unfit for drinking—why it is I can't go to the
stream, lake, or spring by my house and freely drink of it (or even swim in many cases). The
reason, if its not already abundantly clear, is that a civilized infrastructure (especially, of the
industrial or post-industrial type), necessarily, privileges its being over that from which it derives
its being, i.e., the biosphere, and, thus, will create and foster conditions such that the
contamination of water or the erosion/destruction of top-soils is accepted as inevitable. All this to
say (again) that it is only after the means to a way of life, unmediated by civilization, have been
destroyed (by civilization) does the desire and excitement over the civilized institutions flourish.
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This, then, is what is meant by the circular or self-referential character of civilization's being
justified; it creates the conditions from which it derives its justification.
I return now to the notion of context mentioned in the earlier part of this section. We
may, I think, understand that the civilizing process is a means of constructing context. This
civilized context, however, is still set within the larger context of the biosphere and it is by way
of description, namely in the form of statements (1) and (2) above, that the appeal is made for the
privileging of a civilized context and the forgetting or disavowal of the larger context. Donn
Welton's insight that ―we can get at the notion of context by treating patterns of how signs are
used in descriptions as indications of how we cognitively approach or grasp an environment with
which we are involved,‖ and, clarifying further, that ―Actions can ‗constitute‘ the determinations
of things apart from speech: placing a rock in front of an open door ―unfolds‖ its significance as
a door stop....‖ offers a way of looking at how the justifications for civilization actually function.
I think it is fair to argue that as we experience the grocery store, the tap,73,74 and other institutions
that constitute the referent for the above statements (and their repetitious patterning), the
significance of these institutions is initially ―unfolded‖ as necessary and invariable parts of our
being in the world. It is not, as further reflection would have it, the actual earth, particular
ecosystems, or other species that are experienced or perceived as fundamental to consciousness
or the possibility of our being in the world.
The observations of Swedish philosopher Helena Norberg-Hodge shed light on the above
arguments with a bit more ―concreteness.‖ Her work serves to make visible the connection
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between the actual physical colonization of a people and the colonization of consciousness—the
life-world. After spending more than thirty years with the people of the Himalayan province of
Ladakh, Norberg-Hodge describes their transition from a community ―almost totally isolated
from the forces of modernization,‖ to a people facing ―what can best be described as a cultural
inferiority complex.‖ She explains that, after the region had opened up to foreign tourists around
1975 (primarily because of a road built by the Indian military leading into Ladakh about a decade
earlier), the ensuing ―development‖ had drastically affected the Ladakhi's self-perception. One of
the most illustrative examples described by Norburg-Hodge involves a story of a young Ladakhi
named Tsewang. Norburg-Hodge recalls:
In 1975, I was shown around the remote village of Hemis Shukpachan.... I
asked Tsewang to show me the houses where the poor people lived.
Tsewang looked perplexed a moment, then responded, ―We don't have any
poor people here.‖
Eight years later I overheard Tsewang talking to some tourists. ―If you
could only help us Ladakhis,‖ he was saying, ―we're so poor.‖

She goes on to describe how the influx of tourists brought western-styled movies (not
―westerns‖), dress, values, and religions. An entire ideology quietly descended on the Ladakhi
people, particularly the youth. 75
When we talk about the ―redeeming factors‖ of civilization—those that function to
legitimate civilization as such—there is, as I've said, a forgetting of what created the conditions
such that the present conditions would be preferable. The seed of this forgetting can be traced to
the (still) reigning mythos regarding a ―state-of-nature‖ along with a preoccupation to wrest the
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means of life from those who control it and, further, the petty cultural artifacts that serve, in
conjunction to the previous two factors, as distractions from the ongoing destruction of the
biosphere and social relations. Mythos, preoccupation, and distraction are the primary forms that
serve to misplace, misdirect, appropriate, and placate the desire for what is other than
civilization, even going so far, as I've tried to show, as to render the possibility of uncivilized life
seemingly inconceivable. Again, the analysis turns back to the aspect of the problem regarding
perception. Perception, from the vantage of the everyday of civilization, compounded by the
above three factors, is unlikely to yield an interpretation of one's situatedness or the situation of
the entire culture, in any sort of holistically critical light. Indeed, there is barely any room to
reflect on one's situation between appeasing the forces that lay claim to the means to live.
Though, as this section is concerned with uncovering the arguments or possible reasons
for legitimizing civilization, I will turn now to the intersection of phenomenology and that
discipline which is normally reserved for legitimation, justification, and so forth; epistemology.
For this, a preliminary note may be made of Merleau-Ponty's remarks on knowledge and
phenomenology:
To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which
precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in
relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and
derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the
countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a
prairie or a river is.76
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That ―which precedes knowledge‖ and ―scientific schematization‖ is the sense of phenomenon
that is characterized, as Neil Evernden explains, by its ―primordial givenness.‖77 It is
phenomenon unnamed and unclassified. Thus, it is this ambiguous sense of phenomenon in
which, relative to epistemic claims, we must consult ―the things themselves.‖ To inquire into the
truthfulness of a particular epistemic claim, or really any claim at all (implicit or otherwise), is to
delve into the realm of justification. Though, as Zahavi has noted, ―...the only justification
obtainable and the only justification required is one that is internal to the world of experience and
to its intersubjective practices.‖78 Indeed, there seems to be almost universal intersubjective
agreement regarding civilization‘s being justified, but what, aside from what has already been
mentioned, gives sway to this justification? What I am concerned with here is not just whether or
not the arguments for civilization are justified or unjustified (as not all declarations, beliefs, or
actions must carry positive justification) but also, whether the reasons given in justification are
such that we can or cannot make a positive case for or against the legitimacy of civilization. To
reiterate the issue of this sub-section, if civilization is to be indicted as illegitimate I must show
that its claims to legitimacy are either false, unwarranted, or incoherent and then, further, viable
positive reasons against civilization (which, for the most part, have already been mentioned).
I have described civilization's being accepted as a legitimate and inevitable force via a
sequence of colonizations, consciously and otherwise. In a contemporary setting, the acceptance
of civilization comes less directly from direct imperial conquests, of which the current context is
of course a product, but rather, is accepted as the pre-reflective backgrounding of perceptual
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horizons (similar to the ―captivation-in-acceptedness‖ mentioned earlier by Fink and Husserl).
But it is the justification of civilization that brings this kind of acceptedness under more scrutiny.
Here, statements (1) and (2) can again be referenced as the speech acts that intend to
provide positive justification and, consequently, legitimation to civilization. The speakers
statements, obviously enough, are rooted in his or her experience or perception of civilization.
The trick then, in uncovering the truthfulness of the claim or proposition is to ―interrogate in
terms of [the claims/propositions] meaning and then its reference.‖79 Thus, to inquire into the
truthfulness of the claim of ―Civilization is legitimate and justified because of X,‖ is to inquire
into the meaning of civilization and the criterion used for justification/legitimation. At its most
reductive element, the criterion focuses on the basic means to living. The ―defeater‖ for this
criterion, then, would be to show that civilization is actually contrary to the basic means to
living. As I believe it has already been sufficiently demonstrated that civilization is contrary to
these basic means—that its invariable essence is the idealism of infinite expansion and, thus,
unsustainability—I will conclude this section. Arguments pertaining to the enjoyments and
alleged enriching artifacts offered by civilization are irrelevant here when seen in the above light.
Returning now to assumption (2) outlined in the introduction of this chapter (That the
collective ―we‖ can avert the ―oncoming‖ crisis) it may be argued that, if the falseness of (1) can
be recognized, that is, that crisis is indeed present as I have argued, then the discourse changes
entirely. There is, then, no ―changing-of-the-course‖ to preserve current standards and ways of
being (Assumption 3) as these standards, by any ontological or teleological reckoning come at
the eventual expense of all that is other. By assuming the truth of (1), the action that would
79
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proceed from (2) is already dead in the water. Assumption (2), consequently, bears no relevance
to environmental discourse and any action that proceeds from the overall schema of all three
assumptions is, at best, useless and, at worst, counter to efforts that would seek to stave off
further harm and a deepening of the crisis (more on this schema can be found in Chapter Five).
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to describe the roots of the current ecological
crisis so that it may be clear what is and is not relevant or correct in responding to events of
deforestation, atmospheric degradation, and extinction. Most action/discourse regarding
environmental destruction is framed with the backgrounding ―given‖ of civilization and, as such,
fails to identify the source of their problems. For reasons having to do with experience,
interpretative structures, and perception in general, this frame often rests unquestioned. I have
attempted, in the traditional spirit of phenomenology, to maintain a certain descriptive stance, yet
it seems that one cannot help but reach certain normative conclusions. These sorts of
conclusions, however, I believe are warranted and in order to elaborate a bit more on their
relevance, I turn now to the field of Critical Theory and, loosely, what has come to be known as
civilization critique.
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CHAPTER FOUR: AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF CIVILIZATION
VIA CRITICAL THEORY
Ultimately, the previous section can be qualified not only as the addressing of a problem
of perception, but also and more importantly as a description of consciousness-in-civilization.
Humanity continues to undercut its own and others species means to life largely because it has no
clue that such ―undercutting‖ is even happening or that there are actual consequences for this
way of being. This culture, the global-civilized culture, has great difficulty in perceiving the
destruction that is, quite literally, everywhere.80 In some sense, the thoroughly civilized
consciousness is impenetrable to anything that would seek to question the validity of its
epistemic and ontological conceptions. Operatively, this consciousness deals almost entirely with
the highly abstract, ideal, symbolic, and quantifiable. This way of understanding and approaching
being-in-the-world, if the critique of naturalism by Husserl and others is correct, is excessively
short-sighted. However, where Husserl and other phenomenologists seemed to have stopped
short of the possible social and critical implications of their work, the critical theorists of the
Frankfurt school offer insight that, rather potently, addresses consciousness and experience as it
is lived in the midst of destruction, oppression, and domination. Indeed, Adorno, Horkheimer,
Marcuse, and others argue that such destruction, oppression, and domination persists and is
maintained primarily via consciousness and that it is in an analysis of the dialectic between
institutions (social, political, economic, etc.) and consciousness that the grounds for a truly
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emancipatory project may be formed. And though the previous section of this work has focused
on the material conditions of the earth, it is not to be taken in the way that Marx ―inverted‖
Hegel, i.e., that the ground of suffering is absolutely material. Though neither is it absolutely
―spiritual.‖ The genesis of suffering, instead, may be found in examining the interplay–the
dialectic–of particular modes of consciousness and material conditions.
The cornerstone to uncovering this suffering as it is presented, maintained, and replicated
via consciousness rests in an analysis of experience. As many of the phenomenologists dealt
rigorously with the possibilities and structures of experience, the same may be said of the critical
theorists. However, it is Theodor Adorno‘s work in the arena of experience, most notably from
his Negative Dialectics and then, less ―formally‖ in Minima Moralia, that I think, coupled with
the above analysis, will lead deeper and more fruitful insight into constructive responses
regarding the general destruction of the earth.
Adorno’s Negative Dialectics

Adorno‘s negative dialectic has been described as ―the theoretical foundation of the sort
of reflexivitythe critical stancerequired by critical theory. In the negative dialectic we are
offered ways by which, for instance, we might question ‗the given‘ or recognize distortions of
experience.‖81 Hence, as the previous chapter dealt heavily with the notion of civilization-asgiven, it may again be shown how this is possible (yet from a different angle) and in what ways
we may evaluate our contemporary situation. In the first part of his Negative Dialectics, Adorno
argues against (among other things) the conceptions of experience set out by Kant and others.
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Though it is in his critique of Kant that the continuity between the thought of Adorno and the
early phenomenologists can be seen. Both Husserl and Adorno, having rejected the phenomenanoumena schematic of Kantian philosophy, set out to reevaluate the (once again) surreptitious
elements, structure, and contents of experience. But where Husserl and the phenomenologists
cling to the ―things themselves,‖ Adorno shrugs this concept of the thing for what he terms the
―nonidentical‖ (das Nichtidentische). The two notions are remarkably similar (despite Adorno‘s
own protest to the contrary), though, I think the theoretical backing of the nonidentical and its
application to a philosophically based social critique comes a bit closer in concretely applying
such critique.
First, it may be helpful here to briefly touch on one particular, albeit major, Adornian
critique of the alleged purely descriptive enterprise of phenomenology: When we give a rational
account of experience or give any account of experience whatsoever, no matter what our alleged
methodology, the accounting cannot be severed from a normative claim about the world. That is,
no matter the format, descriptions include implicitly or explicitly a claim on how the world
should be. Thus, either by omission (implicitly) or directing statements (explicitly) a normative
claim is made. The claim may be ambiguous or concealed in some way, but it is not wholly
absent. This sort of critique, obviously enough, extends, beyond phenomenology, though it may
also serve to draw out the critical possibilities within phenomenology that, largely, seem to have
been neglected or denied.
In any case, it is the rational accounting of experience that is the target and ―axis‖ of
Adorno‘s theoretical formulations and critique, and a key part to his overall philosophical
approach. Still holding to the rightness of a transcendental philosophy, Adorno‘s negative
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dialectic borrows principally from the endeavors of Kant and Hegel by way of a heavy handed
emphasis on the relationship between experience and rationality. But rationality, Adorno argues,
is not a stagnant immovable structure of consciousness. It is, rather, susceptible to versions that
are more or less specific to, or the product of, various epochs. In its most basic conception, forms
of rationality arise by different understandings of experience. Thus, germane to the discussion
and critique of civilization, the task is to understand rationality as it is in ―civilized‖ accounts of
experience, that is, perhaps, discerning a distinct ―civilized rationality.‖ To note, Adorno‘s
critique of rationality is restricted for the most part to its appearance in modernity through
contemporary society. Regarding this relationship between rationality in modernity, Brian
O‘Connor remarks: ―Modernity, for Adorno, is marked by a dominating version of rationality
that, isomorphic with the economic structure of society, informs all critical enquiry and ensures
that the enquiry falls short.‖82 The ―version‖ of rationality dominant in modernity thus renders
the possibility of a critique that would thoroughly question the actual project of enlightenment or
the contemporary globalized society highly unlikely and perhaps even unthinkable (As I
explained in Chapter 3, contemporary conditions of the everyday offer up virtually no occasion
for such a thorough critique or questioning.). Though the critique of rationality offered by
Adorno is not, I will demonstrate, applicable just to modernity. Instead, it may be levied against
the entire history and project of civilization as such. Though before, further foundational remarks
leading to the application of such a critique are necessary.
a. (Non)Identity
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The consequence of dismantling the ―pure-objectivity‖ of science (discussed earlier) is
that certain claims appealing to the totality of the object examined must be rescinded as the
notion of ―totality‖ is rendered conceptually incoherent and impossible. Adorno‘s account of
experience echoes this sentiment. For him, part of experience is, ideally, the interaction of
subject and object (terms used as a matter of convention and not, necessarily, held as radically
distinct entities) whereby, in the interaction, the subject resists imposing a totalizing claim of
identity or conceptualization onto the object.83 To make the claim of conceptualized identity—an
epistemic claim at its root (informed by certain ontological suppositions)—is, for Adorno,
unwarranted as it presupposes the subject as constitutive of the object, forgetting that the subject
―is from the outset an object as well.‖84 Here, Adorno marks his turn from the alleged ―positive‖
dialectics of Hegel and Marx (wherein a ―positive‖ sense of identity is achieved regarding the
object) and into the negative. Thus, where positive identity had reigned, it is now seen as an
unwarranted construction and, in its place fits the notion of nonidentity. ―Dialectics,‖ Adorno
contends, ―is the consistent sense of nonidentity.‖85 Nonidentity is what arises initially in the
contradicting forces typical of any dialectic (Hegelian, Marxist, or otherwise). But in the
temptation of ―synthesis,‖ of identity, thought or consciousness is carried away from itself,
alienated, from the object of concern. In this alienation and establishment of a particular
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conceptual total identity there is the built-in tendency to, by assuming such totality, seek
dominion over the object. The tendency towards domination may be explained as follows: When
we assume the total being of a particular thing (person, non-human animal, ecosystem, etc.) we
then close ourselves off to that things own possibilities. What would, perhaps, transgress the
ideal totalized identity is suppressed, often times forcefully. This has been the case, historically,
with women, slavery, racism, and the like. Each group has been systematically oppressed based
on an identity that is a closed, totalized fiction, forcefully limiting the flourishing and
possibilities of such individuals/classes. On the other side of the coin, those who are in a position
to bestow such identity (typically males, typically white) attribute to themselves (implicitly) the
power of constitution in regards to the other, thus setting the grounds for the ordering,
commanding, and abuse of the other. This ―identity thinking‖ as Adorno calls it, encourages and
gives form to a rationality that, as he and Horkheimer pointed out nearly two decades prior to
Negative Dialectics, is inherently oppressive.86
Indeed, it is ―identity,‖ Adorno argues, that is ―the primal form of ideology.‖87 Though it
is the notion of a ―constitutive consciousness,‖ i.e., constitutive subjectivity, that gives rise to
both identity thinking and ideology itself; ―The critique of ideology‖ is then, ―a critique of the
constitutive consciousness itself‖ (what Adorno and Horkheimer have also taken to calling
―bourgeois subjectivism).‖88 The turn towards a synthetic-like conceptual identity, an outcome
reached only by assigning constitutive priority to the subject, must therefore be resisted and,
instead, the more primitive sense that grounds all dialectics–the nonidentical–must be, in some
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sense, embraced. I ought to note here the very odd sense that characterizes negative dialectics:
The forgoing of identity thinking is understood, initially, by assuming the framework in which
identity thinking actually maintains its presence. It is an immanent critique of sorts. Through
language, definitions, concepts, or philosophy itself, the thing or the object is forced under the
imposing framework of total identity. But it is only through the employment of such concepts or
philosophies (slightly tweaked), that the things nonidentity ―appears.‖ Though it appears, Adorno
notes, as ―contradiction…under the aspect of identity.‖89 Thus, the method of this entire paper,
its arguments, assume, in part, the framework and conventions of what it has set to critique, i.e.,
civilization.
The nonidentical is, then, the ―hinge‖ of the negative dialectic—―negative,‖ because in
the face of traditional dialectics synthesis is presented as positive identity. But the nonidentical is
not necessarily the opposite of identity, rather, it is the true ―secret telos of identification.‖90
Identity thinking chases the sense of nonidentity but in doing so, becomes implicated in the
straits of ideology. But what kind of ideology is Adorno speaking of here? What is this ideology
guided by and what keeps it afloat? How is this relevant to a discussion of civilization?
Ideology: Equivalency and Instrumental Reason

Ideology may be understood as a form of thinking that distorts, eludes, and conceals an
objective conception or, at the least, the principles for evaluating such objectivity of certain

89
90

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 5.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 149.

61

political, social, and, in the case at hand, ecological realities.91 In classical Marxism, ideology
has been understood as the promotion of a ―false consciousness‖ wherein the subjects of a
particular political establishment are led by that establishment in the development of a belief
system that at once is the legitimation for the dominant class as well as the site of further truth
claims emanating from such legitimation. As such, ideology may be characterized as
fundamentally epistemological in nature. That is, a particular ideology serves both as the site of a
base set of foundational truth claims as well as the production site for further truth claims. These
claims, as traditional definitions have it, arise from the material-social conditions of a particular
society and seek to legitimate whatever conditions happen to favor and further the dominant
status-quo. They are imposed sometimes outright and directly, though, more often subtly as
something akin to a rhythm with expectations and a general feeling of togetherness where
discord is almost inconceivable. Thus, certain antagonisms between various pockets of society
(traditionally in terms of class) tend to become neutralized, more or less, through the force of
ideology, typically through what some have called ―ideological state apparatuses‖92 (Althusser).
Under particular ideological prescriptions, domination, exploitation, and repression all come to
appear as natural, inevitable, and ahistorical—they are the expected rhythmic tides of ideology
that often conceal (i.e., neutralize) the root antagonism. Indeed, the existence of oppressive
conditions is frequently denied (even by those who may experience the brunt of domination) and
appeal is made to the abundance of ―opportunity.‖
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Though getting back to the epistemological elements of ideology, new kinds of
antagonisms are arising—this time regarding the truth content and knowable landscape of a
global material-reality: On the one hand there is the elaborate idealism of economic structures
(here, we may even limit ourselves to capitalism—even with its recent heavy dose of state
intervention, an act that some theorists have argued goes to show the extent to which
―capitalism‖ and hegemonic force will ensure and maintain the status-quo) whose consequences
have very real effects on the economic realities of people, but also on the earth itself. Thus, on
the other hand, is the ecological/biological reality of the earth—an objectively real, material
platform whose existence, as I‘ve been arguing, paves the way for the (im)possibility of capitalist
economics as well as the possibilities, in any knowable sense, of ―being‖ as such. To note, there
is a point of contention being made recently over the charge of the ontological similarity between
communism and capitalism. This point, however, is not to debate the differences/similarities
between capitalism or communism, but rather, productionist economics as such.
The ideology which is at the heart of identitarian thought is one of equivalency. That is, it
is a form of consciousness dominated by the imposition of quantitative abstractions onto objects
as a definitive feature of their being. Only in this abstract quantitative bestowal is it possible to
equivocate qualitatively different things. It is precisely this qualitative difference in
objects/subjects which, as the products of mass industrialism colonize further and further aspects
of everyday life, becomes more opaque and gives rise to the sense that the present state of affairs
is natural, ahistorical, and in no need of justification. Again, as it was described earlier, the
conditions created by civilization itself serve to legitimate, replicate, and further the being of
civilization while at the same time rendering the possibility of critical reflection ever more
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unlikely. Abstract quantification in regards to the equivalency of qualitatively dissimilar objects
is the direct outcome of identity thinking, i.e., in order for equivalency to take place, the
totalizing claim to the things identity (taken a conceptual whole) must be assumed.93
The ideology of equivalency is, then, further than the reaches of any particular political
thought (or political thought in general), a fundament of civilized society and, indeed, the
keystone in the ideology of civilization. It is the underlying force to the myth of scarcity (the
principle ―value‖ maker in the exchange society) imposed, most radically in capitalism, by the
civilizing impulse. But it is the case, presently, that this mythos of scarcity has exceeded its
mythological character and now comes to constitute a primary, ontologically-objective, reality
the world over. By destroying entire populations of plant and animal life, ecosystems, and taking
hold of what is left, modern industry in its quest for infinite economic, and thus social,
domination threatens the possibility of a resurging abundance—an abundance that has
characterized the majority of sentient life‘s being on this planet. Again, in the myth-turnedreality of scarcity is the imposition of conditions that would justify further oppressive conditions,
casting civilization in a quasi-religious salvific light (―Only more civilization can save us from
civilization.‖) and neglect critical reflection.
Adorno saw contemporary society as a highly sophisticated system that is administered and
organized according to principles of commodity exchange, i.e., equivalency. Characteristically, a
society based on principles of commodity exchange tends to subsume every possible entity under
the logic of such exchange. All the while, the antinomies of such principles are systematically
concealed from everyday experience. In terms of value, exchange-as-instrumentalization in
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civilized society (never mind the ―contemporary‖ qualifier) takes the place of what would
normally be perceived as having value or being-valued. The ends of reducing qualitative aspects
of an object into quantitative terms serves only, in the exchange society, for further and further
exchange. Its ends are the ―endless‖ exchange of everything, including sentient life, including
human life, i.e., ―labor.‖ As Zerzan has put it, ―civilization,‖ with all of its surface level
pluralities, ―is fundamentally hostile to qualitative difference.‖ If the global economic system
accepted the primacy of the qualitative it would, in effect, dissolve. I should note here that I think
there‘s a strong case to be made for understanding ―qualitative‖ as what is physically and
materially embodied and what is quantitative as essentially disembodied and abstract.
But the ideology of equivalency is only one side of the coin. The other is the version of
rationality touched on briefly above. Instrumental reason is the guiding force of the logic of
equivalency. It is a kind of pseudo-teleological form of thought that finds its origin in specific
material/historical/social contexts where the focus of thought is oriented in the means of
achieving a particular end (This context, in its widest sense, is civilization). Though more
specifically, while there is an ―end‖ in mind, this ―end‖ is not subject to critical reflection—it is
seen as ―given,‖ self-evident, or simply ―off-limits‖ to critical reflection. The connection
between the ―naturalization‖ of ideological claims and instrumental reason is clear in this
understanding. That is, if certain ideologically informed knowledge claims involve a claim on
what is real, they, simultaneously, include the limiting or dismissal of the possibilities of other,
say, non-ideological claims. The myth of progress serves as an excellent example of the
functioning of what I have described.

65

Progress

When the notion of progress is invoked in say, a State of the Union address, the question
that ought to follow is: Progress toward what? What is it that we‘re really trying to get at? Of
course these questions are not usually entertained. Somehow, the notion of progress itself is
satisfactory. However, if this question happens to be touched on, the answers are typically
something in the order of ―jobs,‖ ―security,‖ or even more ominous, ―growth.‖ These answers are
acceptable within the reigning ideology, but they are dim-witted when paired into a larger
context. Any further questioning about the ―why‖ of jobs is considered nonsensical. They
suppose that a life spent paying to live is in some sense a good way to live. That it is,
philosophically speaking, the ―good life.‖ Paying to live or begging to not be exploited are seen
as ahistorical ―facts of life‖ and thus beyond questioning. Every civilized edifice plays the same
conversation-stopping game: ―This is it, get used to it.‖ It is almost inconceivable to the
thoroughly civilized consciousness—a false consciousness—that one should not have to do such
things or that one could ever think about not doing such things. Indeed, the claim of civilizations
inevitability to continue along its current trajectory arrogantly stakes a totalizing, ordering, and,
thus, dominating claim on the future.
We can understand progress perhaps in the same way that some have taken to
characterizing existence as a kind of movement in ―becoming.‖ Surely the postmodern crowd
will at least entertain this idea. Though this idea is as bankrupt as the philosophies that would
seek, as Zerzan has put it, to ―exile‖ us from ―presence‖—from the immediacy of lived
experience. The notion of becoming never culminates in anything (yet goes on supposing that it
will) and is thus a philosophy most aptly fit for any person or culture with a hard-lined ―death
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urge.‖ The Freudian ―death-drive‖ (Thanatos)—the opposing force to unmediated desire, eros—
that Herbert Marcuse described as a drive within civilization to ―relieve tension,‖ characterizes
the civilized consciousness as a blind groping in the darkness for what relieves itself of
conditions that are self-imposed.94 If a system that presupposes the usefulness of all things as a
means to some end, yet cannot define that end except with other means, it ought to be considered
absolutely nonsensical, perhaps even pathological. This, possibly, is what Freud meant when he
observed that with the advent of civilization—the repression of desire—also came the
―mechanism of neuroses.‖ Remarking on this insight of Freud, it may also be the case that,
Zerzan argues, ―Since this repression and its constant maintenance are essential to civilization,
universal civilization brings universal neurosis.‖95 This notion of inherent repression has been
echoed time and again by the few that have cast a critical light on civilization as such. Indeed,
Adorno and Horkheimer judged that the entire ―history of civilization…is the history of
renunciation.‖96 As a culture built on a myth of progress, its most cogent expression of
renunciation is that of the present. This is especially so if the price of this ―progress‖ is the
annihilation of thousands of species and a life, so far as it regards humans, that is calculated,
administered, controlled, and bound to an impoverished, alienated existence.
In any case, instrumental reason and identity are the formative ingredients to what
perhaps brought the alleged and apparent split between humans and nature (as well as the
concept of nature in the first place). By naming the entities outside of human construction,
―nature,‖ the impulse towards domination was sealed. At once, the natural world—what is
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―other‖ than civilization—becomes purely a part of the status functions of civilized
instrumentation. The world and its inhabitants are, then, what Heidegger termed ―standingreserve‖—entities prepared and readied for the sole use of humans. To be clear, I‘m not arguing
that there is no difference between civilization and say, a pine flatwood ecosystem—clearly there
is. Nor am I arguing that there is no nature (those debates have gotten nowhere and nothing
except perhaps tenure for a few academics). But rather, in the construction of a conceptual
totality like nature, the impulse to dominate and reduce to instrumental-value is an invariable
outcome of such a construction. ―What men want to learn from nature,‖ argue Adorno and
Horkheimer, ―is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men.‖ We can assume the
conceptual term ―nature‖ responsibly by keeping in mind the notion of nonidentity.
While the ideology of equivalency and its handmaiden, instrumental rationality, may be
the primary grounds for civilizations establishment and replication, it is in the moderns (Bacon,
Galileo, Newton, Leibniz, et. al.) and the precursive thought to industrialization, where this
oppressive pair really becomes apparent. Finding a path in the metaphysics of Locke (especially
those regarding property) and then further, the theories of Adam Smith, the ideology of
equivalency, mediated through industrial business, rapidly set-upon the natural world. But, as
folks like Zerzan have pointed out, our current state of affairs is not simply some miscarriage of
reason that occurred in the lead to industrialization, but is, rather, the culminating ends of
civilization as such. In contemporary society, the ideology of equivalency is running aground
into objective realities of ecology. Whether climate change, deforestation, massive global losses
in bio-diversity, oceanic dead-zones and acidification, and so forth, the fantasy of ideology
continues to be revealed.
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If ideology as ―false consciousness‖ is the tendency in thought and action to distort
experience or the content of experience to then give rise to a kind of epistemic ―production
center,‖ then getting at the bottom of uncovering ideology requires a deeper examining of the
contents of experience and the being of the objects of experience and how it is that a ―distortion‖
or concealing actually happens. I‘ve already discussed the notion of context and the missteps of
identity thinking and equivalency, but the thrust of these arguments has largely been focused in
the realm of epistemology. What is needed now is a turn to the kind of ontology that supports or
is assumed in ideology. I approach the bridge between ideology and ontology with the following,
albeit contested (Rorty), premise: the knowledge claims that are bolstered by the reigning
ideology are ultimately derived from ontological understandings (again, unstated or not). They
concern the being of entities that are both the object of civilization and the grounds of
civilization. Thus, I think it is appropriate that we turn again to the phenomenological tradition,
particularly that of Heidegger and his work regarding technology.
Heidegger and Technology
Higher Man is a tragedy. With his graves he leaves behind the earth a battlefield and a
wasteland. He has drawn plant and animal, the sea and mountain into his decline. He has
painted the face of the world with blood, deformed and mutilated it.
--Oswald Spengler97
Civilization, whether in a contemporary setting or in its beginning stages, can be
characterized as thoroughly and definitively technological.98 This definition is not to associate
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particular kinds of technology to what is civilized, but rather, to note that its being is in the
―essence of technology.‖ But what does this mean?
For Heidegger, the essence of technology ―is nothing technological,‖ that is, it has not to
do with particular kinds of technology, specific instruments, or tools. Instead, the technological
is a way of thinking about and approaching things in the world. For him, the task of uncovering
the essence of the Real (we may also say ―object‖ in the sense that Adorno used it) is something
that we humans have always tended towards, yet go about in different ways. One of these ways
is technological. It is a mode of ―revealing.‖ A revealing of what though? Heidegger traces the
Greek word for revealing, alētheia, to its translation by the Romans, veritas, i.e., truth, and
concludes that technology is a way of revealing the truth of the Real. Ultimately though,
Heidegger‘s expedition into technology is rooted in a desire to understand and illuminate
humans‘ relation to Being. Loosely painting the context of contemporary humans, he observes
that ―everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm
or deny it.‖99 His remarks seem to echo the opening statements of Rousseau‘s Social Contract:
―Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains.‖100 ―Everywhere‖ may be synonymous with
the everyday. Our ―everyday‖ is bound up in the technological, the civilized, and we must, if that
is the case, begin again to look at how the specifically technological understanding affects our
notions of being, non-being, and from that understanding gain an even firmer grip on what it is
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we call civilization. Indeed the ―Question Concerning Technology‖ is a large footnote to the
question concerning the meaning of Being and thus also to the confrontation of non-being.
Understanding the ―revealing‖ nature of technology stems, in Heidegger, from a close
examination of technology as ―contrivance,‖ as instrumental. Within the instrumental, the
immediate invocation is of ends and means. And while the popular definition of technology as a
neutral tool, as an entity to be manipulated and used to manipulate, involves a kind of means and
ends conception, this definition is shortsighted and incorrect according to Heidegger. Indeed,
Heidegger warns that in regarding technology as neutral we become absolutely ―blind to the
essence of technology.‖ Instead, technology is instrumental insofar as it is a means of revealing,
of ―bringing-forth‖ (Poiēsis) the space in which ―truth happens.‖ Here, we may be reminded of
the inescapable normativity in all statements/descriptions (i.e., revealing) described by Adorno
and note that the technological carries within itself a concealed normativity. But the particular
brand of revealing prescribed by technology is in bringing-forth that which ―does not bring itself
forth and does not yet lie here before us….‖101 Thus, unlike physis (nature), which is also a
bringing-forth (yet it is from itself), technology requires its objects to yield before it—to become
―unconcealed,‖ as it were, from without.
Where we can tie the knot between technology and civilization, via Heidegger, is in the
notion of enframing (Ge-stell), the essence of technology. I mentioned at the beginning of this
paper the tendency for civilization to ―enframe‖ the interpretation and understanding of the
contents of experience, experience itself, and the world in general, without delving into the full
breadth of what it means to enframe. First of all, the word ―enframe,‖ clearly enough, invokes
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the notion of a ―framework,‖ or the framing of a thing, and so forth. But in Heidegger‘s usage,
this is only partly right. Enframing, aside from being the framing of things, is more
fundamentally, another specific kind of revealing. To get at the rest of the meaning we can look
at a breakdown of the German prefix ge and suffix stell. According to most scholars, the prefix
ge of Ge-stell ―denotes a totalizing‖ of sorts (e.g., Heidegger points out that where Berg is taken
to mean mountain, Gebirg ―signifies an entire mountain range.‖) that, in this case, when coupled
with the verb Stellen (―to set or put in place, to arrange, to regulate...to set upon.‖) moves past
the mere framing of a thing, particularly and singularly, and into the active framing of things in
totality. 102 The totality in question, for our purposes, is civilization—the technological society
and its ―setting-upon‖ of the world. All things, of nature or otherwise, are subsumed into the
instrumentality and equivalency of civilization under the revealing auspices of technology. This
revealing is described by Heidegger as having ―the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a
challenging forth.‖ He explains:
…challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is
unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is
stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is
distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking transforming,
storing distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But
the revealing never simply comes to an end.103
Heidegger follows up by noting that the challenging also ―does not run off into the
indeterminate.‖ But this claim remains unsubstantiated, especially when viewed from an
understanding of civilization that acknowledges the idealist premise of infinite growth. Indeed
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civilization sets its trajectory towards an indeterminate version of ―progression,‖ scurrying about
trying to regulate, secure, and order all things and, in doing so, may be cast to the most
unsuspecting and insidious version of nihilism.
In his discussion of ―passive nihilism‖ John Zerzan argues that the myths of progress, of
technology—of civilization—carry within themselves ―an enfeebling ethos of meaninglessness
and indifference.‖104 As ―Technology mediates between individuals and nature, ultimately
abolishing both,‖ the religion of efficiency, i.e., instrumental rationality, sacrifices in almost
every case, moral or ethical concerns.105 Quite literally, civilization (whose essence is wholly
technological) carries a mythic and insatiable ―end‖ that seeks only to challenge forth the real to
―[reveal] itself as standing reserve.‖106
Before moving on, I should note that Heidegger‘s use of enframing is held almost entirely
within the context of a discussion of so-called modern technology. While there is a clear
difference between a wooden bridge and an industrial dam, the industrial dam (or
industrialization as such) is a culminating effect of the built-in ontology of civilization itself. The
dichotomy between the technology of the ancients and the moderns is held together only by
considering the context of such technology, i.e., civilization, as neutral. This as Heidegger and
others have shown is untenable. There is a very particular way in which the revealing of the
world takes place within civilization. The way or process, to reiterate is Enframing. When we
include the notion of civilization, the essence of modern technology, Enframing becomes a
leading characteristic throughout the ancient, middle, modern, and contemporary epochs.
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Enframing as ―the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges
him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve‖ is the outcome of the
setting-upon of the real by civilization in its ever-present need for further and further expansion.
In short, Enframing is the determinant outcome of civilized being. If civilization, as Jensen
described it, is characterized by the growth of cities that ―require the routine importation of food
and other necessities of life‖ it follows then (as Jensen points out) that importations are required
by cities because the surrounding ecosystem has been thoroughly rid of its means to support that
city. That is, the surrounding ecosystem has already been relieved of its potential to support the
kind of activity, locally, in a city. Its contents, conceived as resources, have all been
―unconcealed‖ and converted into the ―standing-reserve,‖ i.e., the undifferentiated energy
potential for the use of humans. And although Heidegger was skeptical about the prospect of
humans being turned into standing reserve, that is precisely the history of the expansion of
civilization, e.g., slavery. If a human community has stood in the way of a particular civilizations
access to some ―vital‖ resource, it has been the case, that civilizations will take, through
whatever means necessary, those resources (destroying, in the process, the previous communities
traditional way of being).
Hence, we arrive at a globalized techno-civilization whose progenitors have
unapologetically pursued the ―ends‖ of progress. And it is through the means of ―an implacable,
universalizing system of capital and technology,‖ Zerzan observes, that the agents of such a state
have ―absorbed nearly all opposition‖ and ―overwhelm[ed] resistance.‖107 The system, as I
touched on earlier, encourages ―a sense of futility that approaches nihilism‖ and ―is now
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accepted as an inevitable response to modernity.‖108 Heidegger, in his essay The Word of
Nietzsche, even defined nihilism as ―the fundamental movement of the history of the West.‖ It is
―the world-historical movement of the peoples of the earth who have been drawn into the power
realm of the modern age.‖109 Indeed, in the same sense that many who claim to have no ideology
are bound to the most insidious form of ideology, the hallmark of nihilism Heidegger points out,
is its disavowal by those by most captured by it. Ideology, then, with nihilism as its underlying
counterpart, characterizes the current global situation as a totalizing, inevitable process, guided
and ―justified‖ by the revealing auspices of Enframing. We may draw a connection here between
the totalizing aspect of enframing and the same tendency in identity thinking described by
Adorno.
Ge-stell, as ―the framework that both constitutes and institutes order,‖ is then, in the same
sense of ideology, the active production site of claims and understandings that are self-defining,
self-legitimizing, and self-replicating.110 To illustrate how the revealing in enframing brings
itself into ―its own manifoldly interlocking paths‖ we may turn to Heidegger‘s example of the
forester:
The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all
appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his
grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry,
whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of
cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which
is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in
their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set
configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.111
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The setting upon of forests, the challenging-of its being as potential for paper, lumber, and the
like, is a concrete example of the instrumentality and totalizing conceptual identities that make
possible the interlocking of enframing and, thus, the illusion of progress. But the fundament of
the interlocking in enframing, the active process throughout, is guided further by a notion of
abstract exchange, i.e., equivalency. To illustrate at least one other aspect of this interlocking
self-perpetuation, we can take note of the often repeated luddite-like claim that the problems to
be fixed by technology are always problems created by technology in the first place. Freud saw
this over eighty years ago, declaring ―in whatever way we may define the concept of civilization,
it is a certain fact that all the things with which we seek to protect ourselves against the threats
that emanate from the sources of suffering are part of that very civilization‖ (my italics).112 To
count on this way of revealing of being in the world (the technological or the civilized) when its
revealing denies the corollary aspect of non-being—of the ―oblivion of Being,‖ as Heidegger
would put it in The Turning—is, then, undoubtedly pathological.
Civilization as Pathological113

The pathological, like the ideological, is founded and maintained through distortions of
the real revealed in experience. The turning away from non-being finds its roots in the pathology
that is ideology and it is in this general civilized ideology that ―Man stands so decisively in
attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that he does no apprehend Enframing as a
claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear
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in what respect he ek-sists (sic)….‖114 The ―exile‖ from presence described by Zerzan may, with
the insight of Heidegger, be more appropriately understood as an exile from Being and, thus, into
non-being. And it is into this exile that the pathological being of alienation, estrangement,
domination, fragmentation, and general oppressive states lay claim and deepen their supposed
inevitability.
From Domestication to Alienation

In the section regarding Adorno‘s notion of nonidentity, it was argued that the imposition
of positive conceptual identity results, ultimately, in the alienation of one from the object. In
more concrete terms, this alienation takes the form of domination via the subjective imposition of
an assumed, imaginary totalizing identity that, in turn, ―cuts‖ off the possibilities of being for any
being(s) or confines it to instrumental use. But what was our first step toward this alienation?
Robin Fox, founder of the Rutgers anthropology department, argues that ―the first great act of
alienation‖ occurred with the ushering in of the polis, the city-state.115 In this section, we may go
back to examine some of the elements covered in Chapter 2, albeit this time with a more critical
eye. The founding elements of the city-state, as I‘ve been arguing, carry particular implicit claims
of how the world ought to be. As such, their modes of being will tend in some way, as Heidegger
argues, to reveal Being and, even if in a nuanced way, the meaning of being and status of beings.
Our task, though, as I‘ve been edging at, rests in determining if civilizations mode of being, of
revealing, rests ultimately in the concealing or denying of non-being. If it is the case, and I think
a great deal of evidence as been presented thus far, that civilization, civilized consciousness, and
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so forth deny the prospect of being-toward-death, finitude, and non-being, then it can only be that
a civilized conception of Being and an understanding of beings is, in the strictures of a finite
material reality, greatly impoverished. In the following, I aim to show that it is not simply a
matter of where civilization has gone wrong, that it has simply taken a misstep, rather, it is the
case that, like technology, civilization is irredeemably condemned by its own nature to tend
towards the destruction of itself and the beings in and around it. Starting with the notion of
domestication, moving then towards division of labor, and throughout other fundaments of
civilized society, I will argue that the fundamental aspects of what makes up civilization
culminate in and require the alienation of individuals/communities from each other, from nonhumans, and from the open possibilities of Being itself.

a. Domestication
Children are not yet fools, but we shall turn them into embiciles like ourselves, with high I.Q.’s if
possible.
R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience116

The idea of man in Europoean history is expressed in the way in which is distinguished from the
animal. Animal irrationality is adduced as proof of human dignity.
Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment117
While the polis may have been the first ―great‖ act of alienation, there were certainly
other, perhaps more subtle and gradual acts or trends that have led to the current state. For
instance, the trend towards domestication. Domestication, the taming of the wild and the bending
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of what is Other to anthropogenic utility, has been identified by Zerzan, Richard Heinberg, Jared
Diamond, Stanley Diamond (no relation to Jared), Sahlins, and a host of other anthropologists,
philosophers, and academics as a pivotal first step (likely unknowingly) toward civilized society.
―In the ideology of farming,‖ (farming as an ―outgrowth‖ or formalized system of domestication)
Paul Shepard observes, ―wild things are enemies of the tame; the wild Other is not the context
but the opponent of ‗my‘ domain.‖ We see, here, a marked parallel between the thinking of
domestication, i.e., taming, and the identity thinking described by Adorno. Assuming the usevalue of an animal or plant as a mere accordance to human want also assumes (or falsely
―constitutes‖) the being of that object in total and thus, as discussed above, sets the stage for its
domination. Even further, Shepard argues, is the phenomenon that through ―A select and altered
little group of animals, filtered through the bottleneck of domestication, came in human
experience to represent the whole of animals value to people.‖118 Our experience or, rather, our
interpretation of experience, is then, as I‘ve pointed out earlier, an integral point of the promotion
and maintenance of false consciousness. As our typical everyday experience within civilization is
comprised of an aggregate sum of domesticated beings and habitats, our experience with these
beings and habitats (as things of instrumental value) loses a certain reciprocity between subject
and object that many have argued is essential to a robust and non-ideological interpretation of
experience (Adorno). Instead of reciprocity, where the nonidentity of the Other, and thus the
dignity of the Other, may be kept in mind, in domestication the experiential relationship is one of
coercion. In this light, Perhaps, we may even call domestication the first setting-upon and
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challenging forth of nature.119 Renowned anthropologist Marshall Sahlins as even declared
domestication as a ―technique of appropriation.‖ It is, possibly, a first move towards a thoroughly
technological society (concurrent with the division of labor which shall be dealt with following
this section).120
Indeed, as Shepard has argued: there is a ―psychology of domestication‖—a particular
rationality, consciousness, or way of approaching the world. The shift into an agrarian society,
necessarily, means a shift in the meaning of the being of land and surroundings. It is, again, a
fundamental shift in ontology, perception, and thus experience of the world and Other. The
changes in animals via domestication, changes, in turn, the way humans look at animals. But this
relationship is not entirely one-sided. The further domestication extends, the further humans,
then, seem also to undergo a domestication of sorts. By noting the features most prevalent and
valued in the domestication of animals, a parallel may be drawn to their being as instrumental,
and the being of contemporary humans.121 The noted and desired features of domesticated
animals ―include plumper and more rounded features, greater docility and submissiveness,
reduced mobility, simplification of complex behaviors (such as courtship), the broadening or
generalizing of signals to which social responses are given (such as following behavior), reduced
hardiness, and less specialized environmental and nutritional requirements.‖122 But it is the
culmination of these effects that, Shepard argues, leads to ―infantilization.‖ He explains:
The style conveyed as a metaphor by the wild animal is altered [in
domestication] to literal model and metonymic subordinate: life is
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inevitable physical deformity and limitation, mindless frolic and alarms,
bluntness, following and being herded, being fertile when called upon,
representing nature at a new, cruder level.123
Thus, via domestication, we come at a picture of life not dissimilar to the ―state of nature‖
described by Hobbes or other apologists for civilization.124 It promotes the idea that without
civilization, ―life is inevitable physical deformity and limitation.‖ We then accept this
inevitability and, like the domesticated animal continue about our daily lives ―following and
being herded.‖ But our ways of framing these situations of following and being herded, namely
via linguistic and aesthetic devices (e.g., ―newspeak‖ in the case of linguistic hedging or fashions
and architecture in the case of aesthetics), obscure and conceal the reality of the situation. So in a
two-fold manner, the myth of what is uncivilized, being propped up by domestication, seeks to
justify civilization and, simultaneously (by an appeal to the ―naturalness‖ of the myth), the
oppressive conditions for its furtherance. On a philosophical level, there is absolutely no
epistemic justification or warrant for the premise being assumed in traditional defenses of
civilizations (or attacks on nature, if you prefer). Perhaps it is the case that this entire myth has
been bolstered by a rather crude naturalistic fallacy. The ―ought‖ of domestication and civilized
being is supported by the fictional ―is‖ of the myth. But again, as I pointed out earlier, the myth
of things like scarcity is increasingly being willed into material reality.
The desired features of domesticated animals, their infantilizing effect, are the same
means/ends of the domination of humans in civilization. As Zerzan has argued, it is ―not just the
taming of animals and plants,‖ that domestication begets, ―but also the taming of human instincts
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and freedoms.‖125 Similarly, Zerzan observes, as domesticated animals are almost entirely
dependent upon humans to be cared for, we humans are also have been ―made increasingly
dependent and infantilized by the progress of civilization‖ (recall the earlier section, ―The
Genesis of Civilization‘s Being Given).126 The autonomy of the individual or community
decreases in tandem with the increase or spread of domestication. The domesticating impulse of
some humans is not dissimilar to those who have colonized human communities in every part of
the living world. By destroying one community‘s means to live, a colonizer may then enforce his
way of being as the only possible way of being.
The first parallel in Shepard‘s definition may be to note the global percentage increase in
obesity. This is clear enough, folks are getting fatter, less healthy, and less active.
However, the second point in Shepard‘s description to parallel with the human
community—submissiveness and docility—may be noted in societies inability to successfully
resist and, to some extent, perceive the varying movements and manipulations of power (i.e., a
tendency toward submissiveness and docility) whose concentrations are, contrary to Derrida and
others, nameable, discernible, and real. This point is a bit more complex to draw out, but
nonetheless it is worthwhile and a keystone in understanding how we perceive and experience
civilization as a totalized, universal, ahistorical, unchangeable fact of life (i.e., that ―resistance is
futile‖).
The docility and submissiveness of certain human communities is most evident in socalled first world countries. Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, forcefully argued that the statusquo, throughout history, has promoted, encouraged, and even ―ensured‖ the docility of those to
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be controlled and manipulated. However, according to Foucault it wasn‘t until the mid 18th
century, the heyday of Enlightenment, that the merger of mechanization and docility join to form
the fundament of the horrific epoch of industrialism. ―The body,‖ argues Foucault, as an ―object
and target of power‖ finds its genesis in the twin ―registers‖ of ―submission and use‖ and
―functioning and explanation‖ aptly formulized and set by enlightenment thinkers….
Domestication, at its base, can be appropriately classified as a method of systematic
control. But the movement for further control over the means to live and lives in general is taken
to further heights in the systematic division of labor. Indeed, division of labor proceeds
concurrently with domestication.
b. Division of Labor

The dividing and organizing of individuals into specialized centers of production with
tasks that are, ideally, singular in nature is a basic description of what we may call the division of
labor or specialization.127 To divide into specialty necessarily paves the way for social
stratification, for hierarchy. Whether priests, press (pundits), government officials, experts of
every imaginable field lay claim to the fundamental aspects of being in the world. If
―domestication involved the initiation of production,‖ it was in a fully regimented and
administered division of labor that, Zerzan argues, ―completed [the] foundations of social
stratification.‖128 Indeed, as Zerzan points out, modern life is impossible without the division of
labor. It is thus, he declares, that if one wishes to question or do away with civilization, one must
also question or do away with another of its most fundamental structures of organization,
127
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division of labor.129 Specialization is a constitutive factor, phenomenologically speaking, of the
contemporary life-world. The everyday and the context of experience are always, within
civilization, reckoned from the standpoint of one held within interlocking specialties. It is what
makes possible civilization in the sense that its active promotion maintains and expands
civilization as such. So as not to get too far into purely anthropological explanations, I should
note here that there are philosophical underpinnings, metaphysical and ontological assumptions,
bound up within such an institution. Similar to the discussion of technology in general, division
of labor prescribes a particular way of being, understanding, and approaching the world.
Thus, for a philosophical discussion of division of labor, its meaning and its being, it
seems appropriate that we begin with its first detailing in western philosophy: Plato‘s Republic.
The first mention comes as a commentary made by Socrates on the nature of man. Individuals, he
argues, differ greatly in their natures and thus some are ―suited‖ for some tasks and others for
other tasks.130 This foundational passage, as many have pointed out, serves as the justification
later made for the tripartite division of society. In Socrates explanation, as Stanley Diamond has
put it, ―it is imagined that the identity of the individual is exhausted by the single occupation in
which he engages. The occupational status, so to speak, becomes the man, just as his class
position is, in a wider sense, said to be determined by his nature.‖131 Thus, we come in
civilization to define an individual based on their work. This is evident in almost every social
gathering and meeting of strangers; ―Hi, nice to meet you‖ and so forth until, the defining
question appears: ―So, what is it that you do?‖ We create social divisions based on occupation.
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The notion of ―self‖ in civilization is based on work and, more radically, the work that furthers
civilization. Indeed, so deep is the stake of bourgeois subjectivism that in our jobs, we presume
somehow to ―make a living.‖ To conceive of ones being in this way, necessarily rearranges ones
interaction with the Other (whether, human, non-human, ecosystem, and so forth).
Philosophically, what this means is that, much like Hegel or Marx supposed, in our work
we become able to realize the self—the master/slave dialectic continues on, yet the masters
disavow their status and the slaves stand by the seeming inevitability of their situation. But where
it was the arrangements of labor that had Marx and others so preoccupied, what we ought to be
looking at is production itself. An analysis of the means of production, granted, may tell us much
about our immediate situation, but it does not necessarily answer the question of production
itself, i.e., production for what, for whom, or to what ends?132 For most (and this is especially
evident in the work of enlightenment thinkers and Marx), it is a belief that through production,
with production being synonymous with progress, we may be led to greater emancipation, greater
freedom.
Considering its philosophical roots in Plato‘s text, it may be agreed, as Adorno and
Horkheimer observed, that even ―Philosophy believes that the division of labor exists to serve
mankind, and that progress leads to freedom.‖133 Dispelling this myth of a progress-in-andtowards-freedom requires only that we briefly survey the breadth of what guides this thinking
towards ―progress.‖ This is a complicated task, but with some groundwork already laid down in
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the realm of technology—a fundamental piece in our conceiving of not just ―freedom,‖ but the
human situation in general—the following should not be too difficult.
Stanley Diamond remarks that ―the division of labor is…an expression of the socially
available technology.‖134 The division of labor, then, may be seen primarily as a movement of
technology, mirroring its changes and innovations and, similarly, maintaining, perhaps even
reinforcing, the kind of rationality and revealing that the technological entails. Indeed, in
specialization (especially of the sort involved with industrialization), the human is a source of
undifferentiated energy, a replaceable piece of equipment in the machinery of productionism. As
Heidegger has pointed out, the further technology pushes into mechanization and industrialism,
the more at risk becomes the revealing of Being. This ―push‖, however, is only possible through
the division of labor (compounded with the above noted features of technology). The rationality
of production is held, as I discussed earlier, in instrumentalization and an ideology of
equivalency. Division of labor, then, subsumes this rationality and ideology, but does so on the
following basis: that trade exists, that an economic structure, complete with institutions and
people to enforce its order, exists. The sort of trade or economy in which specialization becomes
the primary force, namely on account of its efficiency, is one of ―mass‖ scale. That is, one that
requires imports. Socrates and his interlocutors agreed when it came to the need of imports in the
city, but they also made it clear that the need for imports directly correlates to the need for slaves,
as well as an army (given that the city will, by design, expand).135
However, under Heidegger‘s criticism of Plato and Aristotle‘s metaphysics as
―productionist,‖ the explanations given by these eminent philosophers may be understood in a
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135

Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, 181.
Plato, The Republic, 369b-373e.

86

more critical light. By a productionist metaphysic, it is meant that ―for an entity ‗to be‘…it must
be produced.‘136 Granted, as Heidegger and many others have pointed out, production for the
ancient Greeks was of a very different sort than industrial technology. Though nevertheless,
according to Heidegger, the underlying metaphysic and ontology of the ancient Greeks was the
genesis for modern technology.137 In Zimmerman‘s words, ―The technological understanding of
being, the view that all things are nothing but raw material for the ceaseless process of
production and consumption, is merely the final stage in the history of productionist
metaphysics‖ (my italics).138
In a context whereby ever-increasing production is needed to survive, it follows that
stricter and more mechanized divisions will continue to permeate society and the individual. This
is the double side of the division of labor; production as well consumption is necessary. Here, we
come to view the individual and her being in the specialized and stratified society. The division
and fragmentation of the individual, as many have pointed out, is indeed a direct result of the
divisions and subsequent antagonisms of a constructed social inequality. It reduces man, argues
Herbert Marcuse, down to a ―one dimensional‖ subject; easily manipulated, submissive, and
docile in the face of ever increasing pressures to conform and remain uncritical. Understanding
specialization as technology, the following remarks by Marcuse illuminate our situation:
―domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through technology but as technology, and
the latter provides the great legitimation of the expanding political power, which absorbs all
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spheres of culture.‖ He goes on to add that through this technological way of being, we are
provided with ―the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man,‖ and confronted with the
‗―technical‘ impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one‘s own life.‖ However, the
insidiousness with which this ―unfreedom‖ is born and continued is concealed by the alleged
―comforts of life‖ and the assumed goodness of increased/increasing production.139 It is the case,
however, that what is construed as a comfort of life is, instead, the instruments through which
antagonism‘s and docility are furthered. Be it the television, the automobile, the computer, air
conditioning, and so forth, each alleged comfort and utility further stultifies, alienates, and
divides the individual.
The increased divisions between human and human (which must also imply a division
between nature and nonhuman) is a result of the specialization in labor. The face of the Other
that Levinas has so beautifully reminded us of—a founding movement in empathy and ethics—is
mediated so as to be obscured or entirely absent. And though Levinas restricted his analysis to
human-human interaction, I think it would be just to apply this analysis to non-humans as well.
c. Domestication, Divided Labor, Divided Cognition
To take a contemporary example of the divisions between people, the alienation from
both self and Other, and the underlying push towards domestication, I think it may be helpful to
briefly look at the phenomenon of internet based social networks. These institutions, under the
auspices of ―Face-book,‖ the bastion of contemporary social achievement (or at least one is led to
think), is neither the integration of the face-to-face nor ―book,‖ in the sense that it may contain
substantial information about anything (not saying all books do, necessarily, contain substantial
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information). Instead, the ―face‖ presented is one carefully chosen according to certain fashions,
a photo wherein the idealization of ―a good time‖ was likely reinforced by a photographers
beckoning: ―okay, everybody smile!‖ and the ―book‖ is the careful combination of a formatted
questionnaire and sound-bite ―status updates.‖
Indeed, Facebook and similar other social network websites may, according to Lady
Greenfield, a professor of synaptic pharmacology at Lincoln college (Oxford) and director of the
Royal Institution (―the oldest independent research body in the world‖), be responsible for the
future ―infantilization‖ of an entire generation. She explains that the typical child‘s experiences
with sites like Facebook ―are devoid of cohesive narrative and long-term significance. As a
consequence, the mid-21st century mind might almost be infantilised, characterised by short
attention spans, sensationalism, inability to empathise and a shaky sense of identity.‖140 Her
hypothesis of this infantilization is rooted in a larger cognitive and social schema that she
describes as involving a ―marked preference for the here-and-now, where the immediacy of an
experience trumps any regard for the consequences.‖141 And though Greenfield says this may be
characteristic of the mid 21st century mind, it would follow, given the current ecological crisis,
that the tendency to disregard consequences, obsess over sensationalism, and the shrugging of
empathetic engagement, is in fact characteristic of much of the contemporary consciousness.
Is this not the exact parallel of productionism and civilization in general? The dialectic of
technology, wherein humanity‘s own creations reach back into our being and decisively shape—
domesticate—our further actions and creations is evident with each passing day. Actions are
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being taken that seem so necessary now, (e.g., drilling for oil, increasing production efficiency,
or simply perpetuating the growth of the global economy) and, indeed, are necessary within the
civilized context, yet these very actions cut off the possibilities for the being of entire species and
perhaps, as some have suggested, even our own. The ethical implications of this cognitively
reinforced way of being are daunting. If neither empathy nor a concern for consequences is
present in one‘s ethical deliberations, what else is left to determine what ought to be done?
Just as Facebook is the substitution for the face-to-face, so to is the general trajectory of
civilization/technology a substitution of the Real for the non-real. We may be more specific and
say the substitution of the ―ontologically objective‖ for the ―ontologically subjective‖ (Searle).
This critique of the short-sightedness involved with civilization, its rationality and
obsession with abstract quantification and equivalency, has been covered by a number of
academics. At the forefront of such a critique is eco-feminist Val Plumwood. With the comments
on rationality already made, we may take Plumwood‘s insight into the poverty of the dominant
systems ―rationality‖ and the further commentary offered by Ronnie Hawkins, and, perhaps,
draw nearer to etching out possibilities for ways of being that do not require the wholesale
slaughter of ecosystems, their inhabitants, or the general impoverishment of the human condition.
In doing so, the reinforcement of the dominant systems implicit ontological, epistemic, and
rational commitments on a cognitive level (not dissimilar to the example of Facebook) will be
made clear.
Plumwood describes the ecological crisis ―as involving a centric and self-enclosed form
of reason that simultaneously relies on and disavows its material base.‖142 That this is the form of
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civilized rationality and ideology discussed earlier is clear. In step with the critique of
instrumental reason offered by Adorno and Horkheimer, Plumwood‘s analysis requires that we
reject the promise of emancipation and progress from the reason heralded by eminent
enlightenment thinkers and, instead, reevaluate the rationality of traditional and dominant
―rationalism.‖ Rationality, then, as way of approaching and making sense of the world, must,
Plumwood claims, take into account our material and embodied existence in the world or, as she
puts it, our ―ecological embeddedness.‖ The coherency or rationality regarding such ecological
rationality takes the material-biological world as its primary truth-qualifier. This, then, is
opposed to the traditional rationalist appeals to formal logic and abstract systematization—
referents that, in a global economic context, have proven disastrous for the biosphere and many
of its inhabitants. As Plumwood and Hawkins suggest (and as was mentioned at the beginning of
this text), there is a deep contrast to be drawn between ―economic rationality‖ and ecological
rationality. It is the ecological rationality proposed by Plumwood and Hawkins—the way of
making sense of the world by paying attention to the world, the way things feel, and a
recognition of the realness and corporeality of the biosphere—that, contrary to the instrumental
reason of civilization, must be the guiding force in the truly emancipatory project of liberating
ourselves and the earth from civilization.
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CHAPTER FIVE: REDEMPTION143
―The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in [the] face of despair,‖ writes
Adorno, ―is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the
standpoint of redemption.‖144 Adorno writes this towards the end of his text, Minima Moralia—a
text whose subheading reads: ―Reflections from a Damaged Life.‖ Indeed, if the situation is as
stark as many have described it, all we have to offer is a reflection from a life situated within the
continuing destruction of both the life-world and the material-biological world (upon which the
former is derived). It may be argued then, given the above reflections of civilization as,
fundamentally, a movement towards non-being—towards destruction—that its possibilities
regarding redemption are nil. In all of its manifestations, civilization has failed to prescribe
anything less than the wholesale destruction and division of the earth and its inhabitants. As
Jensen declared, ―Civilization is not and can never be sustainable.‖
An indictment of civilization, however, is not a mere plea for its philosophical rejection
(perhaps in the style of Robert Paul Wolff‘s ―philosophical anarchism‖). While this is a first step,
it is only part of the process toward what would be presented as holding redemptive possibility,
that is, a way of being that is not predicated on the destruction and division of oneself and the
natural world. Rather, in its fullest sense, this rejection implies the need for active
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reconciliation—a kind of praxis, if you will, that seeks in every instance further reconciliation
and recognition of what is Other (however, still maintaining the aspect of nonidentity described
by Adorno). This goal, then, is the proper response in the Kantian and critical theorist tradition of
a movement towards further emancipation and liberation. Though what might this praxis look
like? Where does it start and what ends may we say are truly emancipatory? How might we get
there?
First, if, as I attempted to show in Chapter One, that the processes of civilization do
indeed threaten the possibilities of life on the planet—that all is at stake—then it follows, as a
matter of active response, that all options towards averting a kind of total biospheric collapse
ought to be on the table, so to speak. As Zerzan advised, ―When everything is at stake, all must
be confronted and superseded.‖ We can conceive of this reconciliation between human and
human, human and non-human animal, and humans and the earth, not as a mystical, religiouslike effort, but rather, as a fundamental rearranging of certain ways of being in the world, certain
ways of approaching, interpreting, and understanding ones being amongst others. Our dwelling
on the earth is always permeated with the being of what is other (Heidegger‘s Mitsein) and
hitherto, the relationship to such beings (again, whether human or not) has been in appropriation
and domination. A shift in this way of being is absolutely necessary in the sense that, as I‘ve
been saying, if such reconciliation is forgone so too are the possibilities for the existence of not
only an innumerable amount of non-human species, but also, perhaps the human species itself.
But this praxis ought not be reckoned as just a new theoretical exposition to be entered as one
competing idea amongst thousands, rather, its hearkening is in the tradition of a practical
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wisdom, of phronesis. Here, our concern is directly with our acting and being in the world, not
merely with attempting to describe or explain it.

Where to Start?
I‘d like to pick up from the end of the previous chapter and expound a bit more on the
positive contribution of adopting an ecological rationality. This sort of rationality, as noted
above, rests on the rather self-evident premise that cognition is embodied, that is, that our
thinking is intimately intertwined with the material and sensuous being of the earth and our
bodies. This being, in turn, requires (as I‘ve said) certain physical elements for its continued
existence. My thinking, my behavior—each is correlative to an embodied state. If I have been
deprived of food for a number of days, my penchant towards critical thought (or the immediate
possibility of exercising such thought) will be exceptionally diminished. I participate in the
world at every moment as one entirely immersed within the processes of a material world. To
even talk about what may be ―immaterial‖ (indeed, to talk at all), requires a particular materially
bound context that makes possible the conceiving (or perhaps, in some cases, the recognition) of
the immaterial, or the ideal. If it is otherwise, there is no evidence in experience, science, or
elsewhere to make such a claim.145 This, then, has been the thesis of this work (and perhaps, to
some extent, of Zerzan, Jensen, Plumwood, Hawkins, et. al.); that the primacy of the subjective
in the form of economics, the authority of the state (indeed, institutionalized authority as such),
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etc., which, by material force finds its genesis and possibility, neglects that which made its being
possible in the first place and, by such neglect, is ruinous to the existence of itself and others.
Our first step, then, towards an emancipatory praxis is to reevaluate how we make sense
of the world—to perhaps embrace something like the so-called ―land ethic‖ of Aldo Leopold. It
is contrary to the care we exhibit in life (by virtue of our very existence) to act in a way that
would, under the auspices of ―goodness‖ and the promotion of ―life,‖ undermine the very
possibilities of such existence. However, the adopting of a different rationality involves,
correlatively, the adoption of entirely new ontological paradigm—one that mirrors, informs, and
is informed by the above sense of rationality.
For this insight, I think we ought to pay attention to a few remarks made by MerleauPonty in his posthumously published notes, The Visible and Invisible. Here, Merleau-Ponty
develops what has been called an ―ontology of the flesh.‖ Metaphorically applying the notion of
flesh to describe ―an ‗element‘ of Being,‖ Merleau-Ponty contends that we may understand our
being in the world (a corporeal, Real world) as consisting of a constant ―intercorporeity‖ wherein
we and the sentient or non-sentient ―flesh of the world‖ are, in a sense, intertwined. More
specifically, in regards to our perception of the world and being in the world, he contends that as
we recognize our perceiving in the world, we also must recognize our possibility of being
perceived. It is this notion that, as I pointed out much earlier, leads Robert Kirkman into
describing our being in the world as highly vulnerable, with this vulnerability often being
somewhat concealed from experience. However, this vulnerability—the ―fragility of the real‖—
is made clear, as Merleau-Ponty had it, when we understand the merging, colliding, and
intertwining of our flesh and the flesh of the world—the fundaments of perception—and uncover
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the realness of ―the belongingness of each experience to the same world…as possibilities of the
same world.‖146
Here, I think we can begin to delineate a way of understanding the world that, like
Adorno, begins to hand over ontological primacy to the object and the overall context of
ourselves and the object. Our understanding of the world is one that implicitly recognizes the
sharedness of the world. We needn‘t etch out all of the peculiarities that differentiate species, nor
pose an overarching stance regarding ―superiorities.‖ Those discussions are, for our purposes
now, irrelevant. What does matter, however, is that we recognize that the world is shared and
neither we, nor other species, can conceivably escape this shared biological reality. And it is here
where the brief exposition of possible theoretical foundations of a non-dominative and
reconciliatory way of being shall give way to some of the more concrete manifestations of such
being—bringing them from possibility to actuality.
But this task, certainly, is easier said than done. We can resolve to adopt these notions in
our personal everyday interactions, but to adopt them solely as a matter of lifestyle misses the
point entirely. Instead, what we ought to be asking is: what kinds of responses are appropriate
given our situation?
For the following, I had originally intended to examine specific contemporary
mainstream approaches to environmental destruction, pointing out their general inadequacy and
inappropriateness for addressing the ecological crisis. Instead, I‘ll examine some of the more
general problems in the popular approach.
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Not only are the current popular ―green‖ movements often subject to severe ideological
hijacking (that the state or certain economic entities tend to co-op certain image-friendly
environmental campaigns), but also, in the participants insistence that such ―above-ground‖
methods are the only acceptable means to address ecological crisis, the tendency is to
unknowingly reinforce patterns of destruction and domination. I don‘t mean to put it lightly, but
it‘s like a game. Environmental activists continue to challenge certain rules and conventions of
the game, but they fail to challenge the game itself (The game here, being analogous to
civilization). There are, as I argued earlier, certain unquestionable structures that are simply
given within our horizon of experience. Many activists are baffled when after countless petitions
have been submitted, they‘ve peacefully marched, held signs, and otherwise exhausted the
predetermined means for expressing disagreement with the decision maker‘s policies, that the
destruction of the natural world continues (I certainly was when I first took note of the
destruction). But this is precisely the problem: the movement towards sustainability, as I‘ve been
arguing, runs counter to the very foundations of a state structure—of civilization. It is thus, that
any actions typically held within predetermined boundaries must be submitted for reevaluation
and, then, insofar as they may aid in the formation of a truly sustainable world, be reincorporated
according to their effectiveness.
A Philosophy of Resistance

By the sheer magnitude of the problem, an acceptance of predetermined boundaries—
moral, legal, ethical, religious, etc.—is undeniably a privileging of the dead over the living. What
I mean is this: these predetermined principles and boundaries for ―action‖ as well as the structure
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that they‘re situated in and emit from, assume that we take their being and continuance as
primary and given, and that we take what is to be changed as a kind of dependent variable. In
this case, the dependent variable treated by the proponents of civilization as well as mainstream
environmentalists is the biosphere. This is implicit in their action and ideology, not as a matter of
explicit philosophy. Jensen has pointed this out and notes that this sort of thinking—that which,
at any cost, seeks to save civilization—is ―entirely backwards.‖ Instead, he argues, ―We need to
do whatever it takes to save life on the planet.‖ 147 Hence, I would like to offer the following as a
brief philosophical exposition and defense of this ―by an means necessary‖ approach.
To counter the internal logic of civilization, i.e., equivalency, domination, destruction,
oppression, and so forth, there must be a developed strategy with an internal logic of its own; one
that, as a first principle, reverses the ideological and thus experiential schema of civilization-asgiven and the natural world-as-variable. This logic, then, by implication, rejects solutions whose
―ends‖ rest within institutions (state, economic, or otherwise) that, by their nature, promote and
rely on the destruction of the natural world and the domination and division of people. These socalled ―solutions‖ include changes in personal consumer habits, a reliance on technological fixes
(see Chapter 3 on Heidegger and Technology), as well as any general petitions for
state/economic reform. The prevalence of these alleged solutions, however, might be accounted
for by noting the general contemporary political climate and the implicit philosophical
presumptions within such a climate.
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Thus, in the following I will briefly comment on some of the unstated philosophical
premises of mainstream, perhaps we may call it ―liberal,‖ responses to environmental crisis (to
note, this extends to both ―right‖ and ―left,‖ politically).148 In doing so, my hope is that in the
exposure of the falsity of this thinking (as an ends), the scope, tactically and philosophically
speaking, will be opened up to explore routes of resistance that are cogent to the desired goal,
i.e., clichés aside, save the planet. To begin, we may note the general liberal understanding
regarding the process of social and political change. At its fundamental level, the liberal ideology
understands change as emitting from the individual ―where the idea,‖ Cameron Murphey
explains, ―is that social change happens step by step, person by person…and in this way society
is seen as some fluid collection of individuals where the sum of these individuals still equals its
parts.‖149 Essentially, this thinking, from its subjectivist roots, leads to conceiving of the means
of change, in total, as ―an idealistic process—meaning that it happens in the mind.‖ Granted,
there certainly does need to be a change regarding individual consciousness, moving away from
ideology and so forth, but it is not to be taken as a primary end, Murphey explains. Yet it is taken
as a primary end in the liberal tradition. I think we can draw an interesting parallel here to
Adorno‘s criticism of constitutive, i.e., bourgeois, subjectivity: The liberal, supposing that
simply and solely changing one‘s mind or attitude constitutes, correlatively, the necessary
change in the world, forgets the objective circumstances that constituted the problem (as well as
the subject) in the first place. As Marx had argued that the point of philosophy is to change
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This analysis is owed in large part to a series of recent (2011) talks led by Derrick Jensen, Lierre Keith, and Aric
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Lierre Keith and Cameron Murphey, speaking in Eugene, Oregon on March 4, 2011 at the ―Public Interest
Environmental Law Conference‖ on ―The Failure and Future of Environmentalism.‖ Video of this presentation can
be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jMRXT4Rg1p0 .
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reality, the liberal argues that we must change ourselves. Thus, goes the liberal argument, that if
enough people can make this inner change, then it will inevitably change external circumstances.
Internal/external philosophical problems aside; I think it‘s much more useful to consider if such a
tactic, solely considered, has ever worked in struggles for liberation. The answer, historically, is
a resounding ―no.‖ To illustrate, Lierre Keith parallels the history of colonialism and indigenous
people with the ideals of the contemporary ―alternativist‖ environmental ideology (The idea that
by living differently, i.e., ―green,‖ people will naturally be attracted to adopt a different way of
life.). She explains that if this liberal model of ―personal example-as-political strategy,‖ was
indeed an effective method at creating change (and not just a feel-good, religious-like purism),
then those who encounter communities that seem to embody the ideal most, i.e., those living
sustainably and in ostensible harmony with the earth, will likely want to adopt such a way of
living. The go-to example, indeed the often-cited inspiration for such an ideal, is, for the most
part, indigenous tribes. But, as Keith explains, in the history of colonizers and invaders into
indigenous lands ―the face-to-face example of an egalitarian sustainable culture has never once
changed the invaders. It has never once brought on an epiphany amongst the invaders.‖ She adds,
―The dominant culture will not change because it sees the non-violent values that we embody
and it will not change because it beholds our beautiful free-range compost pile.‖150 The
difference is between liberal ideal and material reality. Again, to stress: changing oneself is
necessary, but it is not the ends of change.
The focus, considering what‘s at stake, must extend beyond the illusion of the isolated
subject, beyond the notion of a singular self and an identity that is based on what one consumes.
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We are reminded of Gandhi‘s famous line—the dogma of contemporary liberals—to ―Be the
change that you want to see in the world.‖ This becomes problematic if one does change one‘s
consciousness, yet the objective material reality still stays the same.151 That is, if I have resolved
to approach the world with a kind of ecological rationality yet, en masse, the world continues to
be destroyed, my response betrays the purpose of my resolve in the first place. On the other
hand, we could argue that a truly ecological rationality is, indeed, one that looks beyond personal
change and into the shared world.
Observing the ridiculousness of most mainstream solutions to the environmental crisis,
the anonymous author(s) of The Coming Insurrection comment: ―They tell us, ‗everyone must do
their part,‘ if we want to save our beautiful model of civilization. We have to consume a little
less to be able to keep consuming. We have to produce organically to keep producing. We have
to control ourselves to go on controlling.‖152 The logic of the political and economic apparatus
requires that it cede nothing that would invite its own collapse;153 hence, their frenzied
encouragement of solutions that do nothing but reinforce the reigning order of further
consumption. Indeed, the problem is the political, the polis, the city-state as such. As Zerzan has
put it, ―no amount of re-shuffling the deck,‖ i.e., the substitution of some politicians for others,
some institutions for others, or some products for others can change the ―insatiable hunger‖ of
civilizations drive to consume, appropriate, and dominate.154 He cautions further:
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This certainly seems to describe our contemporary situation: With television programs devoted to ―eco-friendly
living,‖ nearly every corporation trying to promote itself as ―green,‖ and bio-fueled war planes, people seem to have
become ―eco-conscious,‖ yet destruction of the natural world continues at an ever accelerating rate with no signs of
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Clinging to politics is one way of avoiding the confrontation with
devouring logic of civilization, holding instead with the accepted
assumptions and definitions. Leaving it all behind is the opposite: a truly
qualitative change, a fundamental paradigm shift.155

Thus, our responses, while perhaps appropriating certain elements of the political, ought
not hold as ―ends‖ the purely political. But how, then, shall responses be structured? Where
might we find a solution?
―Our predicament,‖ writes Zerzan, ―points us toward a solution.‖156 The predicament
here, is this: The planet is being systematically destroyed and we can either accept the continued
destruction of the natural world and its inhabitants as inevitable or; we can recognize that this
way of being—civilization—despite its appearance as inevitable, is subject to collapse and that
this collapse will happen either one of two ways.157 The first: Civilization, like others before it,
will exhaust the necessary means to life. However, in this case the exhaustion is not localized,
rather, it is a kind of global phenomenon. That is, it will destroy the immediate possibilities for
the regeneration of bio-diverse life on the planet. The second: A collapse is brought on by
internal forces, who recognize that to go on destroying everything is counter to the interest of
most sentient and non-sentient life on the planet. This second view of collapse also accepts that
the natural world is, presently, not beyond the possibility for redemption of sorts—for
regeneration. In short, the second view holds that ―the sooner civilization comes down…the
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more life will remain afterwards to support humans and non-humans.‖158 It is in this second
view where we may find the appropriate grounds to act. ―We realize,‖ as Zerzan pleads, ―that
true revolt is inspired by the realization that it is not impossible to bring the disaster to a halt.‖159
―True revolt,‖ then, rejects the inevitability of civilizations continuance as well as all
myths symptomatic of civilized ideology, i.e., equivalency, progress, endless consumption, and
the general privileging (confusing?) of the ideal with the Real. A philosophy of resistance must
be grounded, primarily, in materiality.160
The possibility of the active dismantling of civilization carries with it an implicit premise
regarding the promotion of civilization; namely, that those interested in its promotion and
continuation are autonomous agents capable of deciding whether or not to continue destroying
the earth. As I argued earlier, some of these individuals (and also those who perhaps do not hold
such a stake in civilizations continuance) are often beset with certain ideological understandings
that constrain an ability to see the destruction inherent in civilization. This, however, does not
exempt them from any measure of resistance, forceful or not. But, to be clear, a philosophy of
resistance to civilization, if its guiding principle is the ensuring of a livable planet (livable for
both humans and non-humans), isn‘t concerned with matters of justice or retribution. It is, rather,
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pragmatically concerned with the creation or bringing about of conditions such that the planets
destruction by individuals who could otherwise not engage in such destruction is rendered
impossible. The agency of those destroying is the primary difference from other more ―natural‖
mass extinctions. And it is the fact of agency in all of this that affords the possibility of resistance
and, thus, a way of being that is other than civilized.
The concern and attitude of a philosophy of resistance is necessarily pragmatic. If it were
otherwise, the principle acknowledging the possibility of the destruction of most life on the
planet could not be the guiding standard. Instead, the guiding standard would have to be a
significantly abstract moral precept, one that must be privileged over the possibility of absolute
destruction. Starting from the ground of an abstract moral precept, one‘s ―ends‖ become a
submitted to the abstraction, i.e., the abstract becomes the ends to which material action is
submitted. The concern is no longer for the material, feeling present—the Real—but rather, the
upholding and maintaining of the ―purity‖ of the abstraction. This sort morality, if applied to the
analysis of civilization presented (or really any entity that perhaps threatens the objects of care
and concern) is a contradiction against what it would claim as the object of concern—against
what, necessarily, would be the genesis of such morality. That is, of course, unless one conceives
of the general situation as fundamentally disembodied and immaterial. At that point, the morality
as abstraction, like a Platonic form of sorts, has betrayed nothing but itself.
In any case, the internal logic of a philosophy of resistance to civilization—one that opts
for the active dismantling of civilization—is, as I‘ve said, outward looking and materially
grounded. As such, it will be the case that conflict should come to define a primary relational
terrain between those wishing to promote civilization and those wishing to destroy it. Not only is
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it a conflict between two incommensurable ontologies, but also, as Zerzan argues, from the anticivilization perspective it is between ―two materialities.‖ One of productionism and one of
liberation.161 But this conflict, being immanent to civilization, is very different than traditional
conflicts. Typically, the tendency is to confine conflicts against a particular state or states within
the narrative of revolution. The story is usually the same: one group, through a drawn out series
of events, takes, at the apex of insurrection, the power of the other, maintaining, for the most part
a similar hierarchical power structure. The American revolution, the French, the Russian, and
even the recent ―democratic‖ revolutions in the mid-east and north Africa, follow this pattern.
And to reiterate, each conflict or overthrow, power has ceded only by the oppositions threat of
force, use of force, or the inability of the reigning power to exercise their claimed monopoly on
force (e.g., The Egyptian military‘s unwillingness to follow orders from Mubarak).
But, as I‘ve argued, the problem is not with who, particularly, is in power. Rather, it is
that such power (made possible only through civilization) exists at all.162 Thus the challenge to
such power is not to be found in traditional revolution. It may be revolutionary, but its ends are
not in revolution. Instead, what may be a viable and philosophically substantiated course of
resistance may be found in the very early stages of revolution, that is, in insurrection. Instead of
the goal of replacing certain governments or economic institutions—of falsely assuming that the
161
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world needs ―running‖—at the ―apex‖ of insurrection, resistance ought to be applied towards the
possibility of that apex ever holding sway. That is, in the context of bringing down civilization,
to foster conditions such that a return to what is civilized is rendered nearly impossible.
To return again to the notion of an internal logic of resistance, I would like to argue for a
concept I‘ll call ―pure insurrection.‖ In order to bring this concept‘s relevance to bear, we may
contrast it with what philosopher Paul Virilio has called ―pure war.‖163 Pure war, according to
Virilio and Sylvére Lotringer, describes a global condition in which the difference between war
and peace is rendered increasingly indistinguishable, if not entirely absent. Hearkening back to
Plato, Virilio and Lotringer trace the organization of modern warfare to the organization of the
city as such. They explain that it is not so much in the ―battle‖ itself that is the business of war,
but in the preparation of war—the design and purposefulness of the city, its economy and so
forth. Hence, when we apply this analysis in a contemporary context (as Virilio and Lotringer
do) we find that the interconnections between economies, concentrated within cities, not only
work to make possible the ―war-machine‖ as such, but the increasing interconnectedness also
alters the traditional terrain of warfare itself. The traditional ―theater‖ of war that had
characterized most ―civilized‖ warfare vanishes amidst the complexity and economic
interconnectedness and, in doing so, envelops the world over as a grounds, means, and possible
instrument of warfare. Down to the ―passive‖ individual, explains Virilio and Lotringer, the
context of war is situated in the fabric of the everyday. Not to mention, part of what makes this
notion of ―pure war‖ so daunting, is a recognition of the sheer power—capable of the destruction
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of the world in the most absolute sense—that rests within the technological-military-industrialcomplex.
If we can take this notion of ―pure war‖ and explain it as an active condition that not only
serves to proliferate and ―advance‖ the current conditions, but also mask and conceal the war
upon which it relies—to make such war ―abstracted‖ from its horrific reality—then, I think it is
perhaps also possible to outline a philosophy of resistance whose aims are likewise directed
towards a general self-maintaining condition. Though, of course, the differences between those
struggling against the condition of pure war and those (unknowingly or not) who wish to
maintain it are astronomical.
The condition—the ―ends‖ of a resistance movement against civilization—defined
negatively, is what is not civilization. It is a negation of civilized being, institutions, and so forth,
and in this way, a positive affirmation of what civilization seeks to destroy; namely, as it has
been shown, the material-biological conditions that make life possible for humans and nonhumans. In a more positive sense, and without mythologizing or romanticizing, we can take
insight from those groups whose way of living has been characterized as, more or less,
―primitive.‖ Indeed, as anthropologist and ethnographer Pierre Clastres points out, the history of
primitive peoples—of those with no State and, thus, no civilization—is ―the history of their
struggle against the State.‖164 Pure insurrection, then, by refusing the apex of revolution and
state-based organization, resists at every level possible, the thrusts of civilization. This applies
further to a condition of what may be called post-collapse (if ever applicable). Now that we have
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outlined the ends of a pure insurrection, the question of ―How and in what sense, philosophically,
might or ought such conditions arise?,‖ may be attended to.
As the administration of pure war rearranges the terrain of traditional conflict, so too
must a resistance organize itself according to varying shifts in spatial conceptualization—a
spatiality that recognizes the depth beneath the veneer of civilization‘s spectacles. To this point,
and that of Plato, the invisible committee has observed: ―The armed forces don‘t simply adapt
themselves to the metropolis, they produce it,‖ i.e., one seeking to actively resist civilization
must understand that, especially in a contemporary setting, civilization is largely a militarized
context. This is, additionally, what removes the idealist and abstract ―ends‖ from the
insurrectionist‘s repertoire; by refusing the media-state spectacle, the tactics of ―protest zones,‖
and other prescribed bounds of resistance, the insurrectionist can penetrate deeper into effective,
that is, pragmatic, means of resistance. The goal is not to ―symbolize‖ ones opposition, it is,
rather, to oppose as such. The strategic, in every case, takes precedence over the symbolic. Pure
insurrection, in this sense, is a philosophy of an almost pure pragmatism rooted in acting. And it
is this sort of acting, I conclude, that is needed if we wish to take the critique of civilization
seriously.
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